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ABSTRACT
Researchers often require and collect sensitive information
about individuals to answer important scientific questions that
impact individual health and well-being and the public health.
Researchers recognize they have a duty to maintain the confi-
dentiality of the data they collect and typically make promises,
which are documented in the consent form. The legal interests of
others, however, can threaten researchers' promises of confiden-
tiality, if they seek access to the data through subpoena. Certifi-
cates of Confidentiality (Certificates), authorized by federal
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statute, are an important tool for protecting individually identi-
fiable sensitive research data from compelled disclosure. How-
ever, questions persist in the research community about the
strength of Certificate protections, and the evidence on which to
judge the strength is scant. In this article, we address those
questions through a careful examination of the legislation and
regulations concerning Certificates and the reported and unre-
ported cases we have identified through our legal research and
interviews with legal counsel about their experiences with Cer-
tificates. We also analyze other statutes that protect research da-
ta to compare them to the Certificate's protections, and we re-
view other legal strategies available for protecting research
data. Based on our analysis, we conclude with recommenda-
tions for how to strengthen protection of sensitive research data.
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INTRODUCTION
Researchers often require and collect sensitive information
about individuals to answer important scientific questions that
12 [Vol. 14:1
2013] CERTIFICATES OF CONFIDENTIALITY 13
impact individual health and well-being, and the public health.
For example, developing effective drug treatment programs re-
quires understanding how, when, and why people use and ob-
tain drugs. Without people's willingness to share information
about their sexuality, sexual behaviors, and drug-using behav-
iors, we would not have discovered how HIV spread and effec-
tive ways to prevent it. In these and numerous other contexts,1
researchers recognize they have a duty to maintain the confi-
dentiality of the data they collect and typically make promises,
1. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on Certificates of Confidentiality,
OFFICE OF EXTRAMURAL RESEARCH, NAT'L INSTS. HEALTH (June 20, 2011),
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/coc/faqs.htm [hereinafter FAQs on Certifi-
cates]. The NIH website on Certificates of Confidentiality recognizes the broad
range of research that may collect sensitive, identifiable research data. Its "il-
lustrative" list of research areas that are eligible for a Certificate includes:
[r]esearch on HIV, AIDS and other STDS; [s]tudies that collect infor-
mation on sexual attitudes, preferences, or practices; [s]tudies on the
use of alcohol, drugs, or other addictive products; [s]tudies that collect
information on illegal conduct; [s]tudies that gather information that
if released could be damaging to a participant's financial standing,
employability, or reputation within the community; [r]esearch involv-
ing information that might lead to social stigmatization or discrimi-
nation if it were disclosed; [r]esearch on participants' psychological
well being or mental health; [g]enetic studies, including those that
collect and store biological samples for future use; [and] [r]esearch on
behavioral interventions and epidemiologic studies.
Id. See also Leslie E. Wolf & Bernard Lo, Practicing Safer Research: Using the
Law to Protect the Confidentiality of Sensitive Research Data, IRB: ETHICS &
HuM. RES., Sept.-Oct. 1999, at 4, 4-7 (discussing the legal protections availa-
ble to protect sensitive research); Gary B. Melton, Certificates of Confidentiali-
ty Under the Public Health Service Act: Strong Protection but Not Enough, 5
VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 67, 68-69 (1990) (discussing the expanded scope of certif-
icates of confidentiality "beyond mental health and substance abuse re-
search"); Kimberly Hoagwood, The Certificate of Confidentiality at the Nation-
al Institute of Mental Health: Discretionary Considerations in Its Applicability
in Research on Child and Adolescent Mental Disorders, 4 ETHICS & BEHAV.
123, 123-24 (1994) (discussing the application of Certificates of Confidentiali-
ty to mental disorder research); M. Justin Coffey & Lainie Ross, Human Sub-
jects Protections in Genetic Research, 8 GENETIC TESTING 209, 209-10 (2004)
(focusing on the use of Certificates of Confidentiality for research using genet-
ic information); Zachary N. Cooper et al., Certificates of Confidentiality in Re-
search: Rationale and Usage, 8 GENETIc TESTING 214, 214 (2004); Charles L.
Earley & Louise C. Strong, Certificates of Confidentiality: A Valuable Tool for
Protecting Genetic Data, 57 AM. J. HuM. GENETICS 727, 727 (1995); Kristin F.
Lutz et al., Use of Certificates of Confidentiality in Nursing Research, 32 J.
NURSING SCHOLARSHIP 185, 185 (2000) (discussing the use of Certificates of
Confidentiality for nursing research); Patricia A. Carney et al., Current
Medicolegal and Confidentiality Issues in Large, Multicenter Research
Programs, 52 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 371, 373-74 (2000) (focusing on Certifi-
cates of Confidentiality use in health care settings).
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which are documented in a consent form.2 These promises of
confidentiality typically include a promise to restrict access to
the data and not to publish individually identifying infor-
mation.3
The legal interests of others, however, can threaten re-
searchers' promises of confidentiality if they seek access to the
data through subpoena. For example, there recently was a high
profile subpoena for research data more broadly: In 2010, the
Virginia state attorney general subpoenaed research data from
a prominent climate researcher, formerly from the University
of Virginia, following release of emails concerning data on glob-
al warming, to determine whether the professor "violated Vir-
ginia's fraud laws in seeking state funding for research."4 In its
petition seeking to block the subpoena, the University of Vir-
ginia suggested the subpoena constituted harassment that
threatened to chill research on climate change.5 A state judge
held that the attorney general failed to present sufficient evi-
dence of fraud and did not have the authority to investigate
fraud in federal grants.6 The attorney general then appealed to
the Virginia Supreme Court, which has agreed to hear the
case. 7 Around the same time, Arizona's Superintendent of Pub-
2. Wolf & Lo, supra note 1, at 5 (explaining the obligations stem from the
ethical principles of beneficence, which require researchers to minimize risks,
and respect for persons); see also 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(1), (a)(7) (2005) (con-
taining the principles which form the foundation for the Common Rule, which
explicitly obligates researchers to minimize risk and, "when appropriate," to
maintain confidentiality of data and the privacy of subjects).
3. Wolf & Lo, supra note 1, at 5.
4. Sindya N. Bhanoo, University of Virginia Asks Judge to Block
Subpoena, GREEN BLOG (May 28, 2010, 5:03 PM),
http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/28/quash-the-subpoena-u-va-urges/; see
also Scott Jaschik, Another Subpoena for Research, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Aug.
13, 2010, 3:00 AM), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2010/08/13/arizona.
Note that some of the examples in this paragraph do not involves human sub-
jects research data, but they are useful in demonstrating the wide range of po-
tential litigation uses for research data and how that can place confidential
human subjects research data at risk. They also point to some of the strategies
lawyers have used in seeking to protect the data. (This caveat applies to more
than the first example.).
5. Bhanoo, supra note 4; see also Jaschik, supra note 4.
6. John Collins Rudolf, Hearing Is Set in Climate Fraud Case, GREEN
BLOG (Mar. 12, 2011, 9:00 AM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/12/
hearing-is-set-in-climate-fraud-case/.
7. Id.; Brian McNeill, Judge Sides with UVA in Climate Case,
Dismissing Cuccinelli Demands, DAILY PROGRESS
http://www.dailyprogress.com/news/2010/aug/30/11/judge-sides-uva-climate-
14 [Vol. 14:1
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lic Instruction sought raw data from University of Arizona and
Arizona State University researchers who conducted research
on education of English-language learners (ELL) in Arizona.8
The Superintendent sought to use the data to challenge conclu-
sions reached by the researchers who were acting as expert
witnesses in a federal suit concerning Arizona's approach to
ELL education.9 A judge ordered the universities to reveal the
names of the schools that participated in the studies, but not
the individual teachers and students. 10 In 2011, the US Gov-
ernment issued a subpoena on behalf of the United Kingdom
for data from a Boston College oral history project on the
"Troubles" in Northern Ireland." It was understood that au-
thorities intended to use the data for criminal prosecutions. 12
Such use would violate the promises researchers made to re-
search participants that their data would be kept confidential
until they died. 13 Furthermore, researchers studying the Deep-
water Horizon oil disaster and responses to it, with its at-
tendant litigation, anticipate that their research will be sub-
poenaed. 14
case-dismissing-cuccinelli-ar-479678/ (last updated Aug. 30, 2010, 12:33 PM).
8. Jaschik, supra note 4; Mary Ann Zehr, Arizona Subpoena Seeks
Researchers' ELL Data, EDUC. WK. (Aug. 12, 2010), www.edweek.org/ew/
articles/2010/08/12/0larizona.h30.html.
9. Jaschik, supra note 4; Zehr, supra note 8.
10. David Glenn, In Research Dispute, Judge Orders Arizona Universities
to Disclose Schools' Names, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Aug. 23, 2010),
http://chronicle.com/blogs/ticker/in-research-dispute-judge-orders-arizona-
universities-to-disclose-schools-names/26397; Court Order at 2, Flores v.
Arizona, No. CV 92-596-TUC-RCC (D. Ariz. Aug. 19, 2010) ("[I]ndividual
research participants were promised their anonymity would be preserved and
the Court intends to honor that promise.").
11. Jim Dwyer, Secret Archive of Ulster Troubles Faces Subpoena, N.Y.
TIMES, May 13, 2011, at Al; see also Scott Jaschik, Oral History, Unprotected,
INSIDE HIGHER ED (July 5, 2011, 3:00 AM),
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2011/07/05/federal-government-question
s confidentiality of oral history; Ben Wieder, Boston College Fights Subpoena
for Confidential Interviews on Irish Violence, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (June 8,
2011), http://chronicle.com/article/Boston-College-Fights-Subpoena/12785 1/.
12. Dwyer, supra note 11.
13. Wieder, supra note 11.
14. Richard Knox, Legal Battles Over Oil Spill Could Foul Reearch on
Health Effects, SHOTS: NPR'S HEALTH BLOG (June 23, 2010, 11:57 AM),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/20 10/06/23/128030107/1egal-battles-over-gulf-
oil-spill-could-foul-research-on-health-effects; Stu Hutson, Fight for Subject
Confidentiality Threatens Disaster Research, 16 NATURE MED. 833, 833 (2010);
INST. OF MED., REVIEW OF THE PROPOSAL FOR THE GULF LONG-TERM FOLLOW-
UP STUDY: HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE SEPTEMBER 2010 WORKSHOP 13 (Lynn
16 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 14:1
As these cases demonstrate, research data may be put to a
wide range of uses in litigation. In some cases, the subject of
the litigation is tightly connected to the research questions, and
litigants' interest in the data is not surprising. Researchers
conducting tobacco-related research or research on occupational
or other environmental exposures, for example, are relatively
frequent targets of subpoenas to support or defend against
claims or to challenge the findings of experts or undermine
their credibility.15 Similarly, those conducting research on con-
troversial topics, including those involving criminal activity,
should not be surprised that their data may be considered use-
ful in building cases. 16 In other cases, litigants' interest in the
Goldman et al. eds., 2010), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/
NBK50908/pdf/TOC.pdf (explaining that treatment of research data from the
Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska provides precedent to release of data for the
Deepwater Horizon spill); see also Eliot Marshall, Court Orders 'Sharing' of
Data, 261 SCI. 284, 284-86 (1993).
15. See, e.g., Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1546-47
(1985) (detailing that industry sought data from Toxic Shock Syndrome stud-
ies for use in products liability action); Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.,
740 F.2d 556, 557-58 (1984) (detailing that industry sought data from cancer
registry in connection with products liability action relating to use of diethyl-
stilbestrol (DES)); see also, Confidentiality Order Re WHI Study Data, In re
PremPro Products Liability Litigation, No. 4:03-CV-01507-WRW (E.D. Ark.
Feb. 1, 2005); Order Re: Motion to Quash Subpoenas Re Yale Study's Hospital
Records, In re Phenylpropanolamine Products Liability Litigation, No. 1407
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 19, 2002). When data are sought to defend against a claim,
the requester may want identifiable data, which is less relevant to requests
intended to challenge the research findings. Some have reported that the to-
bacco industry used this tactic against journalists, as well as researchers. See
Andrew A Skolnick, Burning Mad Tobacco Industry Turns Heat on Major
News Media, SCIENCEWRITERS: NEWSL. NAT'L AsS'N SCI. WRITERS (Nat'l
Assoc. of Sci. Writers, Berkeley, Cal.), Summer 1994, available at
http://www.aaskolnick.com/naswtob.htm; Marcia Barinaga, Who Controls a
Researcher's Files, 256 SCI. 1620, 1620-21 (1992). In some cases, the impact on
researchers has been extreme. In one case, a Georgia researcher twice was
successful in protecting his research data from disclosure to the tobacco indus-
try, but the industry then sought the records from his institution, a state med-
ical college, as public documents. The researcher resigned from the school af-
ter it failed to support his efforts to protect the documents. Skolnick, supra
note 15. In 2011, the Georgia legislature revised its evidence law, effective in
2013, to include protections for researchers' raw data from subpoena. GA.
CODE ANN. § 24-122 (2011).
16. Jaschik, supra note 8 (referring to Boston College Northern Ireland
oral history project as one prime example). Another well-known example is
that of sociologist Rick Scarce, who conducted research on the Animal Libera-
tion Front, which subsequently claimed responsibility for a break-in at Wash-
ington State University research labs. Prosecutors sought his data for use in
2013] CERTIFICATES OF CONFIDENTIALITY 17
research data may relate to individual participants, rather
than the research in question, and may not be anticipated.17
When the data they collect could place research partici-
pants at risk from disclosure, researchers need to take steps to
minimize that risk.18 Certificates of Confidentiality (Certifi-
cates) are an important tool for protecting individually identifi-
able, sensitive research data from compelled disclosure.19 As
described more fully below, federal law authorizes the Secre-
tary of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Attorney
General in the Department of Justice (DOJ) to issue Certifi-
cates to protect such data, whether or not the research is feder-
ally funded.20 The scope of the protection, according to the au-
thorization statutes, is large: "[Persons granted a Certificate]
may not be compelled in any Federal, State, or local civil, crim-
inal, administrative, legislative, or other proceedings to identify
such individuals." 21 However, questions persist in the research
community about the strength of Certificate protections, and
the evidence on which to judge the strength is scant. 22 The
the criminal case. When Scarce refused to provide it, he was placed in jail for
contempt of court. Marshall, supra note 14, at 285. See also JONI N. GRAY ET
AL., ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN AIDS RESEARCH 13-17, 63-68 (1995) (ex-
plaining that HIV researchers have long been cognizant that the research they
conduct could put their participants at risk of criminal prosecution based on
their sexual or drug-using behaviors).
17. Leslie E. Wolf et al., Certificates of Confidentiality: Legal Counsels'
Experiences with and Perspectives on Legal Demands for Research Data, 7 J.
EMPIRICAL RES. HUM. RES. ETHICS 1 (2012) (providing an example that of de-
mographic data, including income, might be sought for custody and child sup-
port purposes).
18. See Wolf & Lo, supra note 1, at 5.
19. See infra Part II. It is important to recognize that the projects we have
described in this introduction may not all be eligible for a Certificate. For ex-
ample, although a project need not be federally funded to receive a Certificate,
it does need to be within the NIH "mission." FAQs on Certificates, supra note
1. Accordingly, the Boston College oral history project may not qualify for a
Certificate because the topic falls outside the NIH mission. Whether the oral
history is considered "research" as defined under the federal regulations could
also affect whether the project was eligible for a Certificate. Donald A. Ritchie
& Linda Shopes, Oral History Excluded from IRB Review, ORAL HIST. ASSN
NEWSL. (Oral History Assoc., Carlisle, Pa.), Winter 2003, at 1, available at
http://www.oralhistory.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/opohal99.pdf; see also
FAQs of Certificates, supra note 1.
20. FAQs on Certificates, supra note 1.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 241(d) (2006).
22. Laura M. Beskow et al., Institutional Review Boards' Use and Under-
standing of Certificates of Confidentiality, PLOS ONE, Sept. 4, 2012, at 1, 1-2
[hereinafter Institutional Review Board].
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most frequently cited case that involved a Certificate, the 1973
case People v. Newman, suggests that Certificates are strongly
protective of data. 23 But a 2006 North Carolina case, North
Carolina v. Bradley, raises questions about that protection.24
In this article, we undertake an examination of Certificates
and related statutory protections available to researchers to
enhance understanding of Certificates and how to strengthen
the Certificate's protections. We begin, in Part I, by describing
researchers' obligations to protect the confidentiality of data
they collect. In Part II, we explore the legislative and regulato-
ry history, and the case law-both reported and unreported-
interpreting Certificates to understand the strengths and
weaknesses of Certificates. In Part III, we analyze other stat-
utes and regulations that provide similarly broad confidentiali-
ty protections for research data and the cases that interpret
them and compare them to Certificates. In Part IV, we briefly
examine other legal strategies available for protecting research
data. Finally, in Part V, we make recommendations for how to
strengthen protection of sensitive research data based on our
legal analyses.
I. RESEARCHERS' CONFIDENTIALITY OBLIGATIONS
That researchers have an obligation to protect the confi-
dentiality of information that participants share with them is
widely acknowledged. 25 The federal regulations governing hu-
23. People v. Newman, 298 N.E.2d 651, 652-57 (N.Y. 1973). However, the
court's analysis focused on an apparent conflict between the 1970 Act author-
izing Certificates and a 1972 act, rather than on the Certificate protection it-
self, even though the Court determined that the clinic director did not need to
produce the data. Id. But cf. Laura M. Beskow et al., Certificates of
Confidentiality and Compelled Disclosure of Data, 322 SCI. 1054, 1054-55
(2008) [hereinafter Compelled Disclosure of Data] (examining a case that
indicates "the protection Certificates offer is uncertain"). See also infra Part
II.C.
24. North Carolina v. Bradley, 634 S.E.2d 258, 261-63 (N.C. 2006). The
trial court permitted access to data to assist with the appeal. Although the ap-
pellate court ultimately denied access to the data, it did not consider the Cer-
tificate in doing so. Id. (citations omitted); see also infra Part II.C.
25. See Basic IRB Review, in INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD GUIDEBOOK
(1993), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/archive/irb/irb-guidebook.htm
("IRBs should determine the adequacy of the provisions to protect the privacy
of subjects and to maintain the confidentiality of the data and, where the
subjects are likely to be members of a vulnerable population (e.g., mentally
disabled), determine that appropriate additional safeguards are in place to
18 [Vol. 14:1
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man subjects research (hereafter "the federal regulations" or
the "Common Rule")26 impose an obligation on institutional re-
view boards (JRBs), which review and approve research studies,
to ensure that "there are adequate provisions to protect the
privacy of subjects and to maintain the confidentiality of data"
before approving a study.27 In addition, the federal regulations
require that "risks to subjects are minimized."28 These two pro-
visions of the federal regulations thus impose an obligation on
researchers to take steps to protect confidentiality, at least
when the study methods and topic make confidentiality an is-
sue. The importance of preserving confidentiality is also im-
plied in other parts of the federal regulations. For example,
whether otherwise confidential information, such as medical
records, used in research could be linked back to an individual
is an important consideration in determining whether the re-
search is subject to the federal regulations and requires IRB
oversight.29 Finally, because research often uses information
protect the rights and welfare of these subjects."); see also Wolf & Lo, supra
note 2 (describing the legal and ethical bases for the obligation to maintain
confidentiality).
26. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (2011). The HHS regulations governing the conduct
of research involving human subjects research apply to research that is funded
through that department, including the National Institutes of Health and the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), which together support the
greatest amount of federally funded research. Another seventeen agencies
have agreed to abide by these regulations for their research. Accordingly, the
HHS regulations are referred to as the "Common Rule." Federal Policy for the
Protection of Human Subjects ('Common Rule'), HHS.Gov, http://www.hhs.gov/
ohrp/humansubjects/commonrule/index.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2012); see
also 21 C.F.R. §§ 50, 56 (2011) (promulgating regulations in the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA), which are substantially similar to the Common
Rule). For a comparison between these regulations, see U. S. Food and Drug
Administration, Comparison of FDA and HHS Human Subjects Protection
Regulations, FDA.GOV,
http://www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/RunningClinicalTrials/edue
ationalmaterials/ucml12910.htm (last updated Mar. 10, 2009).
27. Protection of Human Subjects 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(7) ("(7) When ap-
propriate, there are adequate provisions to protect the privacy of subjects and
to maintain the confidentiality of data.").
28. Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(1) ("(a) In order to
approve research covered by this policy the IRB shall determine that all of the
following requirements are satisfied: (1) Risks to subjects are minimized: (i) By
using procedures which are consistent with sound research design and which
do not unnecessarily expose subjects to risk, and (ii) whenever appropriate, by
using procedures already being performed on the subjects for diagnostic or
treatment purposes.").
29. Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(4) ("(b) Unless
otherwise required by department or agency heads, research activities in
2013] 19
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that is legally protected as confidential, such as medical or edu-
cation records, there are often existing expectations about
maintaining data confidentiality. 30
There are a number of ways that researchers may protect
the confidentiality of research participants and their data. For
example, researchers may collect data on sensitive information,
such as substance abuse, other criminal activity, or sexual be-
haviors, through anonymous surveys, thus ensuring that the
information cannot be linked back to an individual.31 Or if data
needs to be linked, researchers may code the data so that it is
not immediately identifiable. In such cases, the researchers
typically limit access to the key of the coding system and take
steps to secure the data through physical means (e.g., locked
cabinets) or electronic means (e.g., password protection). 32 The
researchers also will often destroy the key once it is no longer
needed as an added protection.33
Even without the regulatory requirements, many research-
ers would likely take steps to protect participants' confidential-
ity on purely pragmatic grounds; without assurances that re-
searchers will protect their information, many people would not
participate in research on sensitive topics. 34
II. CERTIFICATES OF CONFIDENTIALITY
As described below, Certificates were originally authorized
in 1970 for research involving drug use. Since the original au-
thorization, the scope of Certificates has been expanded consid-
erably, so that it now covers all types of research methods and
any research topic where breach of confidentiality of individual
which the only involvement of human subjects will be in one or more of the
following categories are exempt from this policy: . . . (4) Research, involving
the collection or study of existing data, documents, records, pathological spec-
imens, or diagnostic specimens, if these sources are publicly available or if the
information is recorded by the investigator in such a manner that subjects
cannot be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects.").
30. See, e.g., Basic IRB Review, supra note 25 (discussing expectations of
privacy and confidentiality in biomedical research compared to so-
cial/behavioral research).
31. Nelson P. Miller, Subpoenas in Academia: Controlling Disclosure, 17
J. C. & U. L. 1, 8 (1990).
32. See Wolf & Lo, supra note 1, at 4.
33. See Basic IRB Review, supra note 25 (regarding "Privacy and Confi-
dentiality.").
34. See Wolf & Lo, supra note 1, at 5.
20 [Vol. 14:1
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information could harm that individual, whether physically,
emotionally, socially, or economically.
A. LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY
Need for Protection. The protections afforded by Certifi-
cates were originally authorized as part of the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (1970 Act).35
Responding in part to the drug problems among returning Vi-
etnam War veterans, the overall purpose of the 1970 Act was
"to deal in a comprehensive fashion with the growing menace of
drug abuse,"36 and to address punishment and rehabilitation of
drug users, as well as to obtain research needed for under-
standing drug use in the United States. Confidentiality protec-
tions were needed, as the House Report recognizes, "[s]ince
drug abuse involves illegal activities under both State and Fed-
eral law, [and therefore,] reliable statistics cannot be obtained
on the actual extent of drug use" without such protections. 37
The enactment of the 1970 Act was the culmination of ef-
forts over several years to reform federal laws regarding drug
use and control.38 In support of those efforts, members of Con-
gress heard testimony describing the critical need for research
on drugs and drug abuse to develop appropriate treatments, 39
as well as the challenges in conducting such research because it
involved illegal activity. Disclosure of data could place the par-
ticipants at legal risk.40 As one researcher explained, Congress
35. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236, 1241 (1970).
36. H.R. REP. No. 91-1444 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566,
4567.
37. H.R. REP. No. 91-1444 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566,
4572.
38. See ROBERT L. BOGOMOLNY ET AL., A HANDBOOK ON THE 1970
FEDERAL DRUG ACT: SHIFTING THE PERSPECTIVE (Charles C. Thomas ed.,
1975) (detailing the history of the passage of the Act).
39. Comprehensive Narcotic Addiction and Drug Abuse Care and Control
Act of 1969: Hearings on S. 2608, S. 2637, S. 1816, S. 1895, H.R. 11701, and
H.R. 10342 Before the Special Subcomm. on Alcohol and Narcotics of the S.
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong. 93-97 (1969) [hereinafter
Comprehensive Narcotic Addiction Hearings] (statement of Dr. Helen Nowlis)
("Now, one of the big problems here is the complete lack of understanding of
what drugs are and how they act . . . . So what we need is not research in the
laboratory. We need research in the field. We need to be able to study the peo-
ple who choose to use drugs, why they choose to use them, the pattern of
use.").
40. Id. at 98. See also Federal Drug Abuse and Dependence Prevention,
Treatment, and Rehabilitation Act of 1970: Hearings on S. 3562, S. 3246, and
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wanted researchers "to study people under conditions where
they must admit they have committed a felony."41 In order to
succeed with such research, researchers "had to guarantee con-
fidentiality. [They] had to guarantee it to the point where
[they], between [researcher and subject], agreed that [they]
would face contempt rather than betray a confidence." 42
The researchers' concerns were not merely theoretical. Re-
searchers described to Congress their experiences with law en-
forcement interference in ongoing research projects, negatively
affecting morale and motivation to continue:
Our studies involve the use of heroin in drug-dependent volunteer
subjects. After a few months of study, our work was brought to the at-
tention of the police of New York City and the commissioner of the in-
vestigation (1966, Mr. Arnold Fraiman). Rather than approach the
problem in a civil fashion, his office exercised their police authority to
issue subpenas [sic] and arrest, to insist that we appear to answer the
charges of illegal use of controlled drugs. 4 3
To continue their research, researchers had to make private
agreements with local law enforcement officers.44 As they ex-
pressed to Congress, the researchers supported the confidenti-
ality provisions in the new law, which they hoped would eradi-
cate these problems. 45 For example, one researcher testified:
A provision of S. 1895 is strongly recommended for this bill: to author-
ize researchers to withhold the names of subjects and to possess and
distribute drugs where required for research without fear of Federal
or State prosecution. This feature will permit field investigators to get
information the public really wants without turning research investi-
gators into informers (or criminals if they ethically insist on withhold-
S. 2785 Before the Special Subcomm. on Alcohol and Narcotics of the S. Comm.
on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong. 168 (1970) [hereinafter Federal Drug
Abuse Hearings] (statement of Dr. Max Fink) ("[R]esearch in drug abuse and
drug dependence is encumbered by the administration of confusing and re-
strictive laws, by police attitudes of repression, [and] by irrational fears of in-
volvement with the laws governing controlled substances."); Narcotics Legisla-
tion: Hearings on S. 1895, S. 2590, H.R. 10019, and S. 2637 Before the
Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency, S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
91st Cong. 315-321 (1969) [hereinafter Narcotics Legislation Hearings]
(statement of Dr. Henry Brill) ("The fear of such disclosure and of prosecution,
especially on State and local levels, has served to hamper needed research in
the past.").
41. Comprehensive Narcotic Addiction Hearings, supra note 39, at 98.
42. Id.
43. Federal Drug Abuse Hearings, supra note 40, at 169.
44. Id. at 172-73.
45. Id. at 172.
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ing personal information.)4 6
Lawyers and judges also expressed their agreement with
the confidentiality provision. Describing the provision as "one
of the most important things" in the bill, one judge expressed
his support of the bill based on discussions with "doctors who
would like to enter the field of research but they feel the con-
stant hot breath of some ardent law enforcer is upon their
necks and they simply will not go into research at all."47 Law-
yer Lawrence Speiser, the Director of the Washington Office of
the American Civil Liberties Union expressed his support as
follows:
There is an obviously sincere attempt in those bills, those provisions
[discussing confidentiality], to prevent disclosure of the names of the
addicts and to prevent any individual who has access to it from being
required to give the name of those individuals, because obviously this
information could be utilized in a criminal prosecution. 4 8
Congress responded to these calls of support by including
the confidentiality provision within many different bill versions
leading to the Act. 49 Though the language of the confidentiality
provision varied from bill to bill, each bill recognized the neces-
sity of maintaining confidentiality of human subjects partici-
pating in drug research.50
Statutory Protection Language. The 1970 legislation au-
thorizing Certificates provided the following:
The Secretary may authorize persons engaged in research on the use
and effect of drugs to protect the privacy of individuals who are the
subject of such research by withholding from all persons not connect-
ed with the conduct of such research the names or other identifying
characteristics of such individuals. Persons so authorized to protect
the privacy of such individuals may not be compelled in any Federal,
State, or local civil, criminal, administrative, legislative, or other pro-
46. Comprehensive Narcotic Addiction Hearings, supra note 39, at 385
(statement of Daniel Freedman).
47. Narcotics Legislation Hearings, supra note 40, at 304 (statement of J.
Samuel T. Tedesco).
48. Drug Abuse Control Amendments, 1970: Hearing on S. 3246, H.R.
11701 and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on Public Health and Welfare,
H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong. 299 (1970) (state-
ment of Lawrence Speiser); see also Comprehensive Narcotic Addiction Hear-
ings, supra note 39, at 404 (statement of Neil Chayet) ("[I]t is unfortunate that
researchers in this day and age have to secure attorneys to help them with
their research, which happens often, and is going on right now.").
49. Comprehensive Narcotic Addiction Hearings, supra note 39, at 123
(comparing five different House and Senate drug bills with a specific compari-
son of provisions for drug abuse research).
50. Id.
24 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 14:1
ceedings to identify such individuals. 5 1
As described in the House Report of the 1970 Act, this new
section grants
the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare a much needed au-
thority to protect the privacy of drug research subjects by nondisclo-
sure of identification data of such individuals. It enables the research,
when authorized by the Secretary, to assure research subjects com-
plete anonymity, with immunity from prosecution for withholding this
identifying information.5 2
The original authorizing statute has been amended several
times. 53 As part of the Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alco-
holism Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilitation Act Amend-
ments of 1974, the scope of the protections afforded by 42
U.S.C. § 242a was broadened from research on "the use and ef-
fect of drugs" to research on "mental health, including research
on the use and effect of alcohol and other psychoactive drugs."54
In 1988, as part of the Health Omnibus Programs Extension of
1988, a wide-ranging law that addressed numerous health-
related programs, several amendments were made to the au-
thorizing statute.5 5 First, the law re-designated sections of the
Public Health Service Act, including locating the Certificate au-
thorization language in its current codified location, 42 U.S.C.
§ 241(d).56 In addition, the range of research protected was
again broadened to include biomedical, behavioral, clinical or
other research, which specifically includes research on mental
health and substance abuse, rather than limiting the protec-
tions to mental health and substance abuse research.5 7 As a re-
sult, the full text of the current authorizing statute, 42 U.S.C.
51. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236, 1241 (1970).
52. H.R. REP. No. 91-1444 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566,
4594-95 (emphasis added). The Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(HEW) was established April 11, 1953. Historical Highlights, HHS.Gov,
http://www.hhs.gov/about/hhshist.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2012). In 1979, the
Department of Education became a separate agency, and HEW became the
Department of Health and Human Services on May 4, 1980. Id.
53. Our review of legislative history did not reveal the reasons for the
changes.
54. Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment,
and Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 93-282, 88 Stat. 125,
132-33 (1974).
55. Health Omnibus Programs Extension of 1988, Pub. L. 100-607, 102
Stat. 3048 (1988).
56. Id. at 3062.
57. Id.
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§ 241(d), which is entitled "Protection of privacy of individuals
who are research subjects," provides:
The Secretary [of Health and Human Services] may authorize persons
engaged in biomedical, behavioral, clinical or other research (includ-
ing research on mental health, including research on the use and ef-
fect of alcohol and other psychoactive drugs) to protect the privacy of
individuals who are the subject of such research by withholding from
all persons not connected with the conduct of such research the
names or other identifying characteristics of such individuals. Per-
sons so authorized to protect the privacy of such individuals may not
be compelled in any Federal, State, or local civil, criminal, adminis-
trative, legislative, or other proceedings to identify such individu-
als.58
The 1970 act also granted the Attorney General similar au-
thority:
The Attorney General may authorize persons engaged in research [di-
rectly related to enforcement of the laws under his jurisdiction con-
cerning drugs or other substances which are or may be subject to con-
trol under this title] to withhold the names and other identifying
characteristics of persons who are the subjects of such research. Per-
sons who obtain this authorization may not be compelled in any Fed-
eral, State, or local civil, criminal, administrative, legislative, or other
proceeding to identify the subjects of research for which such authori-
zation was obtained.5 9
Although this statute has been amended since passage,
none of the changes have affected the Certificate authority.60
Given the DOJ's overall mission and the statute's specific link
to educational and research programs related to drug laws, it is
not surprising that the scope of the DOJ Certificate statute was
not broadened as was the HHS Certificate. In practice, the DOJ
appears to rely on the protections afforded under 42 U.S.C.
§ 3789g for research it oversees or funds, as described more ful-
ly below.61
B. REGULATORY AUTHORITY
While the authority for Certificates' confidentiality protec-
tions lies in the statutes,62 it is the HHS regulations that speci-
58. 42 U.S.C. § 241(d) (2006).
59. Compare Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970, Pub. L. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236, 1271 (1970), with 21 U.S.C. § 872(c)
(2006).
60. See 21 U.S.C. § 872 (referring to the cited history).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 3789g. See also FAQs on Certificates, supra note 1 (stating
when such DOJ's protections apply, the NIH advises against also applying for
a Certificate through the NIH).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 241(d); 21 U.S.C. § 872(c).
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fy the Certificates' form.63 The regulations define the "identify-
ing characteristics" that are protected by the Certificate as "the
name, address, any identifying number, fingerprints, voice-
prints, photographs or any other item or combination of data
about a research subject which could reasonably lead directly
or indirectly by reference to other information to identification
of that research subject."64
The regulations also clearly give authority to the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) to issue Certificates upon applica-
tion, regardless of whether the research project is funded by the
federal government. 65 42 C.F.R. § 2a.4 specifies the content of
an application 66 and the information that must be disclosed to
research participants about the Certificate. 67 The required in-
formation includes that
(1) A Confidentiality Certificate has been issued; (2) The persons au-
thorized by the Confidentiality Certificate to protect the identity of
research subjects may not be compelled to identify research subjects
in any civil, criminal, administrative, legislative, or other proceedings
whether Federal, State, or local; (3) If any of the following conditions
exist the Confidentiality Certificate does not authorize any person to
which it applies to refuse to reveal identifying information concerning
research subjects: (i) The subject consents in writing to disclosure of
identifying information, (ii) Release is required by the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 301) or regulations promulgated
thereunder (title 21, Code of Federal Regulations), or (iii) Authorized
personnel of DHHS request identifying information for audit or pro-
gram evaluation of a research project funded by DHHS or for investi-
gation of DHHS grantees or contractors and their employees or
agents carrying out such a project. (See § 2a.7(b)); (4) The Confidenti-
ality Certificate does not govern the voluntary disclosure of identify-
ing characteristics of research subjects; (5) The Confidentiality Certif-
icate does not represent an endorsement of the research project by the
Secretary. 6 8
63. See Protection of Identity-Research Subjects, 42 C.F.R. § 2a (2011).
These regulations have been unchanged since 1979 and, thus, do not reflect
the full scope of the research that is eligible for protection.
64. 42 C.F.R. § 2a.2(g).
65. 42 C.F.R. §§ 2a.1, 2a.3.
66. See 42 C.F.R. § 2a.4. The application must include a "specific request,
signed by the individual primarily responsible for the conduct of the research,
for authority to withhold the names and other identifying characteristics of
the research subjects and the reasons supporting such request." 42 C.F.R. §
2a.4(f).
67. 42 C.F.R. § 2a.4(j).
68. 42 C.F.R. § 2a.4(j)(1)-(5). The disclosure mirrors the 42 C.F.R. § 2a.7
provisions concerning the effect of the Certificate.
CERTIFICATES OF CONFIDENTIALITY
C. REPORTED CASES INVOLVING CERTIFICATES
There are few reported cases that have interpreted Certifi-
cates and the protection provided by them.69 This is not sur-
prising given that Certificates protect against compelled dis-
covery. For both procedural and practical reasons, few discovery
decisions are appealed and, thus, give rise to reported deci-
sions. 70 This section analyzes the few cases that address Certif-
icates and their implications.
People v. Newman.71 If people are aware of any court deci-
sions regarding Certificates, it is People v. Newman, the first
case to address the confidentiality provision introduced in the
1970 Act. The facts tell a compelling story: because he had a
Certificate that protected the records, the director of a metha-
done clinic was not required to provide clinic records (photo-
graphs) that were subpoenaed for use in identifying a murder-
er.72 The legal story, however, focused more on the conflict
between two statutes than the scope of the Certificate's protec-
tions. 73
In Newman, a witness to a June 7, 1972 murder informed
police that she believed she had seen the murderer prior to the
shooting in the waiting room of a methadone maintenance
treatment clinic where she was also a patient. 74 Based on this
information, a grand jury subpoena was served on Dr. Robert
Newman, the Director of the New York City Methadone
Maintenance Treatment Program.75 The subpoena required Dr.
Newman to produce "photographs of Negro males between the
ages of 21 and 35 who were patients at Unit Two of Delafield in
1972, prior to June 7."76 In response, Dr. Newman moved to
69. To identify reported cases involving Certificates, we conducted legal
research in both Lexis and Westlaw using multiple strategies, including Shep-
ardizing each of the reported cases of which we were aware and looking at any
cases identified through that process, conducting searches on the statutory
authority and the regulatory authority, and conducting searches for the key-
words "Certificate" and "confidentiality."
70. See 15B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §3914.23 (2d ed. 2012) (describing the lack of final-
ity of most discovery orders and, thus, the inability to get judicial review of
them).
71. People v. Newman, 298 N.E.2d 651 (N.Y. 1973).
72. Id. at 652-53.
73. Compelled Disclosure of Data, supra note 23.
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quash the subpoena on the grounds that the production was
prohibited under federal law (which authorized the Certificate)
and New York law (which protected the confidentiality of the
doctor-patient relationship).7 7
The trial court denied Dr. Newman's motion and, when he
still refused to produce the photographs, found Dr. Newman to
be in contempt of court and sentenced him to thirty days in
jail.78 Dr. Newman promptly appealed to the Appellate Divi-
sion.79 While acknowledging the ethical norm concerning the
confidentiality of doctor-patient relationship, the Appellate Di-
vision affirmed the contempt finding.80 However, the Appellate
Division modified the subpoena order to add "appropriate safe-
guards against unnecessary disclosure" by requiring "the wit-
ness [to] view the photos under supervision of defendant Com-
missioner or someone designated by him, and that none of the
pictures may be exhibited to police or prosecutor except that
one which she may identify as the person sought."81 Dr. New-
man appealed to the New York Court of Appeals on the same
grounds.82
The Court of Appeals focused its analysis on Dr. Newman's
claim that the photographs were protected by the 1970 Act.83 In
support of this argument, Dr. Newman produced a letter from
the Attorney General to himself, dated November 8, 1972,
which granted absolute confidentiality to patient records in the
New York Methadone Maintenance Treatment Program. 84 The
letter stated:
77. Id.
78. Id.; see also People v. Newman, 336 N.Y.S.2d 127, 129 (App. Div.
1972).
79. Newman, 298 N.E.2d at 653.
80. Newman, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 129.
81. Id.
82. Newman, 298 N.E.2d at 653.
83. Id. at 654. Dr. Newman also claimed state law physician-patient privi-
lege protected the photographs, a claim the Court quickly rejected. Relying on
the language from the statute, the Court found that the photographs had not
been "acquired in attending a patient in a professional capacity" by Dr. New-
man. Rather, the photographs had been collected by the staff at the clinic to
"prevent unregistered patients from obtaining methadone and registered pa-
tients from obtaining the wrong dosage through administrative errors in iden-
tification." Thus, the photographs served "solely ... a medical management
function" and could not be "deemed privileged confidential information within
the sense of the statute." Id. at 653.
84. Id. at 655.
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I hereby authorize you to withhold the names and other identifying
characters of persons who are the subjects of research conducted pur-
suant to and in conformity with this research project. You may not be
compelled in any Federal, State, or local civil, criminal, administra-
tive, legislative, or other proceeding to identify the subjects of such
research. 8 5
The New York District Attorney contended, however, that
under the Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972 (1972
Act), the "directors of methadone maintenance programs may
be compelled to produce those records upon court order."86 Thus
the Court needed to determine "whether the 1972 Act repealed
the 1970 Act insofar as confidentiality of a patient's record is
concerned."87
Relying on an amicus curiae brief filed for the United
States by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
along with the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention
in support of Dr. Newman's position, the Court turned its at-
tention to the interpretative regulations put forth by the Spe-
cial Action Office in the Federal Register, which dealt with the
1972 Act, but also discussed the 1970 Act.8 8 The Court noted
that the regulations "recited that the 1972 Act was not de-
signed to repeal or amend the confidentiality provision of the
1970 Act."89 Instead, the regulations specifically set out to
avoid this interpretation:
Nothing in either the language or the legislative history of the Act in-
dicates any intent on the part of Congress to amend the provisions of
the 1970 Act or to reduce the protection which can be afforded under
them. Since the language of section 408 permits, if it does not require,
a construction which harmonizes with the 1970 Act, it clearly should
not be construed to authorize a court order in derogation of any exer-
cise of the authority of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Wel-
85. Id. at 655 n.5.
86. Id. at 654. Unlike the absolute protections under the 1970 Act, 21
U.S.C. §1175 under the 1972 Act provided protection to
[r]ecords of the identity, diagnosis, prognosis, or treatment of any pa-
tient which are maintained in connection with the performance of any
drug abuse prevention function conducted, regulated, or directly or
indirectly assisted by any department or agency of the United States
shall ... be confidential and be disclosed only for the purposes and
under the circumstances expressly authorized under subsection (b) of
this section,
where subsection (b) includes disclosure based upon a court order after a
showing of good cause. 21 U.S.C. § 1175 (1976).
87. Newman, 298 N.E.2d. at 654.
88. Id. at 655.
89. Id.
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fare under section 242a(a) of title 42.90
Relying upon the Special Action Office's interpretations of
the two statutes, the Court determined that the 1972 Act "did
not ... affect the provision in the 1970 Act for absolute confi-
dentiality in drug research programs."91 The Court noted that
the granting of absolute confidentiality in the 1970 Act was
necessary to "ensure the success of drug research programs in
which addict participants require anonymity."92 In contrast, the
Court stated that, because the 1972 Act "covered a wide range
of programs and activities ('drug abuse prevention functions')
in which absolute confidentiality was not regarded as a prereq-
uisite to the successful operation of the programs," the confi-
dentiality requirements were necessarily different from those
in the 1970 Act. 93 The Court thus found that "the absolute con-
fidentiality provision of the 1970 Act applie[d] to drug research
programs, such as Dr. Newman's, where the success of the pro-
gram depends upon the ability of the director to guarantee each
patient that his participation will not be disclosed to anyone
not connected with the program."94 Accordingly, the Court held
that Dr. Newman may not then be compelled to produce the
photographs and could not be held in contempt for failure to do
90. Confidentiality of Drug Abuse Patient Records, 37 Fed. Reg. 24,636,
24,639 (Nov. 17, 1972).
91. Newman, 298 N.E.2d. at 656; see also Robert M. McNamara, Jr. &
Joyce R. Starr, Confidentiality of Narcotic Addict Treatment Records: A Legal
and Statistical Analysis, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1579, 1607 (1973) ("Judge Fuld,
however, quoting extensively from the [Special Action Office for Drug Abuse
Prevention] interpretative regulation, held that the 1970 Act confidentiality
provisions were still in effect, unamended by the 1972 Act.").
92. Newman, 298 N.E.2d at 655-56. Accord, State v. White, 363 A.2d 143,
151-52 (Conn. 1975) (distinguishing between the absolute confidentiality of
the 1970 Act compared to the qualified confidentiality of the 1972 Act).
93. Newman, 298 N.E.2d at 656. Judge Breitel, writing in dissent, disa-
greed with the majority's reliance on the Special Action Office's interpretative
regulations. Id. at 657-59 (Breitel, J., dissenting) ("The effect of the [1972]
statute is to place in the court the sole power to disclose a patient's record af-
ter balancing the several interests involved. That is what it says. There are no
qualifications. It does not give any primary or secondary role in the disclosure
to the program officials or to supervisory administrators."). While the majority
stressed the policy issue concerning the success of drug research programs,
Judge Breitel honed in on the law enforcement aspect of the issue by conclud-
ing, "Even if ambiguous language were involved, one should hesitate to ascribe
a meaning to it which may very well mean in this case that a murderer should
go free." Id. at 659 (Breitel, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 657.
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People v. Still.96 Like Newman, People v. Still involved a
subpoena served on a methadone maintenance clinic to produce
records relating to a patient.97 The defendant, Still, was
charged with criminal possession of methadone, a controlled
substance.98 In his defense, Still asserted that he was in lawful
possession of the methadone through his participation in a
methadone maintenance treatment clinic and provided the dis-
trict attorney with a letter from the clinic's project director to
his attorney that affirmed his participation in the program and
the clinic as the source of the methadone in his possession.99
The district attorney issued the subpoena to the clinic to re-
spond to the defendant's reliance on the letter.100
The clinic moved to quash the subpoena, and the trial court
granted the motion with respect to the defendant's records, but
permitted the district attorney to subpoena witnesses from the
clinic regarding its operations.101 The trial court relied on Peo-
ple v. Newman and its interpretation of the protections afforded
under the 1970 Act in quashing the subpoena and rejected the
physician-patient privilege as protection for the records.102
On appeal, the Court ordered the ruling on the motion to
quash modified to order production of Defendant's records from
the clinic to allow the district attorney "to make such limited
inspection and disclosure of those portions of the said books
and records as it finds relevant to the guilt or innocence of said
defendant on the charge mentioned and described in the in-
dictment herein."103 In reaching this conclusion, the court noted
that "the sole issue involved in Newman was whether under
the Federal statute the director could be compelled to divulge
the identity of participants in the programs to the witness and
the police." 104 Unlike Newman, in this case, the clinic is:
not protecting the anonymity of the defendant against identification
95. Id.
96. People v. Still, 369 N.Y.S.2d 759 (App. Div. 1975).
97. Id. at 760-61. In Still, the Certificate was issued under the authority
granted to the Attorney General. Id. at 763 n.3.




102. Id. at 761-62.
103. Id. at 762 (internal quotation omitted).
104. Id. at 763.
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as a participant in the methadone treatment program, for he himself
has disclosed his identity . . . . Thus, by electing to defend on the basis
that the bottle of methadone was lawfully possessed by him in con-
nection with his participation in [the methadone treatment] program,
he has himself waived the benefit of the statutory right to anonymi-
ty. 10 5
Moreover, the Court concluded that:
To quash the subpoena in this case, as the Criminal Term has done,
on the theory that the statute mandates such a result in order to pro-
tect the anonymity of the patient, when he himself has not only re-
vealed his identity but strenuously insists, as a defense to his prose-
cution, that he was a patient, would be giving it (the statute) a
tortured and illogical construction.1 0 6
Allowing only access to records that address the truth of
the defendant's claim about his lawful possession of methadone
gives the district attorney what fairness requires, without jeop-
ardizing the clinic's programs. 107
North Carolina v. Bradley.108 In North Carolina v. Bradley,
Bradley was a criminal defendant charged with "indecent liber-
ties with a minor" and statutory rape. 109 Prior to trial, Bradley
subpoenaed research records pertaining to his granddaughter
from a study conducted by researchers from Duke University
Health Systems. 110 He sought the records to use for impeach-
ment purposes.111 The granddaughter was a prosecution wit-
ness who was expected to testify, (and ultimately did), that
Bradley had sexually abused her. 112 Duke moved for a protec-
tive order on the grounds that the Certificate protected the
study data, which the trial court granted. 113 However, Duke
105. Id. at 765.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 765-66.
108. North Carolina v. Bradley, 634 S.E.2d 258 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).
109. Id. at 260.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 260-61.
113. Id. at 260. The protective order was issued after an initial order to
produce the documents, which would have permitted the study documents "to
be read by the state's chief investigating officer, the witness, the District At-
torney's office staff, the defendant and his wife, the Public Defender's office
staff, the Assistant Public Defender, and any expert the defendant or state
might consult." Compelled Disclosure of Data, supra note 23, at 1054. Addi-
tionally, the trial judge had no prior experience with Certificates and, like the
appellate court, focused first on whether the defendant had met a burden to
demonstrate a need for the documents. Id.
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was ordered to "maintain a sealed copy of the records . . . until
the final adjudication of all issues in this case, including any
appeals or until further order of [the] court."114
After a jury convicted Bradley on all the charges against
him, his appellate lawyer moved for access to the Duke files "to
ensure a full and fair appellate review."115 The trial court or-
dered disclosure of the study documents to Bradley's appellate
lawyer "for the purpose of determining whether any error
should be assigned premised on their contents." 116 Access to the
documents was restricted to the parties' lawyers. 117 Duke ap-
pealed the order requiring disclosure. 118
Bradley sought to set aside Duke's appeal, but the court
permitted it to go forward, holding that Duke
is a party aggrieved and is asserting its legal rights, which have been
directly affected by the trial court's order. The trial court's order effec-
tively requires [Duke] to disclose information concerning the research
subject's privacy which it is obliged, pursuant to the Certificate of
Confidentiality and federal statutes, to protect.1 1 9
Despite this recognition of the obligations the Certificate
imposed on Duke, the appellate court did not rely on the Certif-
icate in its decision. Rather, the court relied on the lack of evi-
dence of materiality of the records to determine the case. Ac-
cording to the court, the matters potentially contained in the
Duke records were "at best tangential" to the case and, thus,
could not have been used by Bradley to impeach his grand-
daughter, even if there were evidence of inconsistent state-
ments. 120 Therefore, the court concluded that "[s]ince defendant
has failed to satisfy the threshold requirement of materiali-
ty, . . . he was not entitled to production or in camera review of
the documents[,] and we need not consider [Duke's] argument
that the confidentiality of the documents was statutorily privi-
leged."121 The appellate court found that the trial court erred in
ordering the documents produced and vacated that order,122
but, at that point, the disclosure had already been made. 123
114. Bradley, 634 S.E.2d at 260.




119. Id. at 262.
120. Id. at 262-63.
121. Id. at 262.
122. Id. at 263.
123. Compelled Disclosure of Data, supra note 23.
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Murphy v. Philip Morris Inc.124 The discovery dispute in
Murphy v. Philip Morris Inc. arose in a personal injury suit
against Philip Morris. 125 The plaintiff, Robert Murphy, claimed
that he contracted lung cancer through exposure to second-
hand smoke, and Philip Morris sought the raw data from a
study conducted by the University of Southern California
(USC), the California Department of Health Services, and oth-
ers, which was pivotal to the United States Environmental Pro-
tections Agency's conclusion that second-hand smoke causes
lung cancer. 126 Philip Morris moved to compel production of the
raw data from USC, and the State of California joined USC in
opposing the motion. 127 According to the Court, USC presented
"a compelling case . . . that the data itself (where the names
and addresses of the participant and family members have
been redacted) in at least in several instances can be used by a
reasonably capable researcher to identify the subject that the
data reflect." 128 The court also recognized that, because the
study for which the data was sought was federally funded, USC
had obligations to preserve the confidentiality of "the names
and 'identifying characteristics' of the subjects," citing to obli-
gations under the consent provisions of the Common Rule and
to the Certificate authorizing statute. 129 Nevertheless, the court
ordered production of the data, in part because "the data itself
without further inquiry does not automatically identify any
participant" and Philip Morris asserted that "it ha[d] no inten-
tion of using the raw data to identify any of the study partici-
pants."130 That production was subject to a protective order
that, among other things, (1) imposed restrictions on attempts
to re-identify the subjects; (2) limited use of the documents to
the particular case; (3) limited the disclosure of the documents
to specified individuals who must first sign a non-disclosure
agreement; and (4) required return of the documents after the
124. Order Granting Defendant Philip Morris' Motion to Compel Produc-
tion of Documents in Response to Subpoena Duces Tecum; Protective Order,
Murphy v. Philip Morris Inc., No. CV 99-7155-RAP (JWJx) (C.D. Cal. Mar. 17,
2000).
125. Id. at 1.
126. Id. at 1-2.
127. Id. at 2.
128. Id. at 4.
129. Id. at 5 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(1)-(5) (part of the Common Rule)
and 42 U.S.C. § 241(d) (the Certificate authorizing statute)).
130. Id. at 4-5.
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case was concluded.131
What is most interesting about the Murphy case is that,
despite the citation to the Certificate authorizing statute, it
does not appear that the study had a Certificate and, thus, that
the statute had any bearing on the case before the court. The
published order never indicates that the study had obtained a
Certificate. Reports from the study do not indicate that the
study had a Certificate. 132 So why does the court's order refer-
ence 42 U.S.C. § 241(d)? It appears that the court adopted the
arguments presented by USC's counsel in its "Opposition of
Third Party University of Southern California to Defendant
Philip Morris' Motion to Compel Production of Documents in
Response to Subpoena Duces Tecum to Records Custodian
and/or to Dr. Anna Wu." 133 In their opposition, USC's attorneys
raise several arguments against the disclosure of the data first
under California law and then under federal law. In section IX
of their opposition brief, "Federal Statutes and Regulations
Protect the Study Participants' Confidentiality and Weigh in
Favor of Nondisclosure," appearing on page 20 of the motion,
USC's attorney argued that:
45 C.F.R. Section 46.116(a)(1)-(5) [part of the consent sections of the
Common Rule], coupled with 42 U.S.C. 241(d), set the minimum
federal privacy requirements that must be observed. 42 U.S.C. 241(d)
requires that the privacy of any individual who acts as a research
subject be protected "by withholding from all persons not connected
with the conduct of such research the names or other identifying
characteristics of such individuals. Persons so authorized to protect the
privacy of such individuals may not be compelled at any Federal,
State or local civil, criminal, administrative, legislative or other pro-
ceedings to identify such individuals. (emphasis added) 134
131. Id. at 6-7.
132. We searched PubMed for publications from the study. We also
searched Google for study documents. The failure to report the existence of a
Certificate in publications from the study is not definitive evidence that the
study had no Certificate. Coffey and Ross found that researchers did not al-
ways report the existence of a Certificate in their publications. Coffey & Ross,
supra note 1. However, as described in more detail later, the documents filed
on the motion further support the conclusion that the study did not have a
Certificate. See infra note 135.
133. Opposition of Third Party University of Southern California to De-
fendant Philip Morris' Motion to Compel Production of Documents in Response
to Subpoena Duces Tecum to Records Custodian and/or to Dr. Anna Wu, Mur-
phy v. Philip Morris Inc., No. 99-07155 CM (JWJx) (C.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 1999)
(on file with authors). To understand the reference, we obtained court docu-
ments relating to the motion to compel from the National Archive in Southern
California. These documents are available from the authors.
134. Id. at 20 (bold emphasis added) (italic emphasis in original).
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This argument appears to be a misunderstanding of 42
U.S.C. §241(d), which grants the Secretary authority to grant
researchers the ability to resist subpoenas for research partici-
pants' identifying information, but does not extend that author-
ity to all research projects. 135 In its reply, Philip Morris' attor-
neys did not address the argument, except to note that it did
not seek identifying information. Thus, it appears that the
court may have perpetuated this misunderstanding.
D. UNREPORTED CASES INVOLVING CERTIFICATES
Because of the paucity of reported cases involving Certifi-
cates, and the limited legal analysis about Certificates within
those cases, we sought to identify cases at any level that might
involve Certificates and add to our understanding of how courts
address them.136 Through our database searches, we were able
to identify some additional cases, although the amount of in-
formation available on each was variable.
In re: Louisville Branch-National Association for the Ad-
135. That this is a misunderstanding is further reinforced by review of the
Opposition to the motion and supporting documents. The Opposition quotes
portions of the consent form referring to general promises to maintain the con-
fidentiality of data, but no reference to the language required by NIH when a
Certificate is issued. The quoted sections are consistent with the language in
the California Department of Health consent forms for the study that are at-
tached as Exhibits to the Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Philip
Morris' Motion to Compel Production of Documents by Intervenor and Inter-
ested Third Party, State of California, Department of Health Services. Memo-
randum in Opposition to Defendant Philip Morris' Motion to Compel Produc-
tion of Documents by Intervenor and Interested Third Party, State of
California, Department of Health Services; Exhibits, Murphy v. Philip Morris,
Inc., No. CV-99-07155 RAP (JWJx) (C.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 1999) (on file with the
authors). It is similarly consistent with Dr. Wu's description of the consent
process in the study, related in the Transcript of Hearing before the Honorable
Jeffrey W. Johnson. Further Hearing Re Defendant Philip Morris' Motion to
Compel Production of Documents in Response to Subpoena Duces Tecum to
Records Custodian of/or to Dr. Anna Wu at 62-68, Murphy v. Phillip Morris,
Inc., No. 99-7155-RAP (JWJX) (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 1999)(on file with authors).
136. To identify cases that have not reached the appellate level, we
searched the "All Federal and State Briefs and Motions, Combined" database
on Lexis and "Trial Motions" database on Westlaw for all cases that referred to
the Certificate statute, regulations, or key words "Certificate" and "confidenti-
ality" in close proximity. We note that neither of these databases is compre-
hensive. We also conducted searches on Google for additional cases, using sim-
ilar approaches. If we identified a case through these means, but did not find
relevant documents (e.g., moving papers or order), we sought to obtain those
documents through appropriate sources, including the PACER database for
federal cases, on-line state databases, and contacting the state court.
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vancement of Colored People/Administrative Office of the
Courts and the University of Louisville.137 This is a Kentucky
Attorney General's Opinion regarding a dispute between the
Louisville Branch of the National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People (NAACP) and the Administrative Office
of the Courts (AOC) and the University of Louisville (Louis-
ville). The AOC commissioned Louisville to conduct a study of
the court to evaluate racial fairness in sentencing. 138 AOC pro-
vided data extracted from court records to Louisville for the re-
search. 139 The data included, among other things, information
about judges, race of defendants, and length of sentences im-
posed. 140 Louisville agreed to strict confidentiality, including
the coding of data to protect the identity of the judges (among
other things).141 The results of the study were reported in Ra-
cial Fairness in Sentencing: A Case Study of Selected Crimes in
Jefferson County.142
The NAACP filed an open records request to the AOC and
Louisville for the "supporting data, documents and other mate-
rials" for the report "to monitor the performance of [the] elected
judiciary through records access." 143 The request specifically
asked for the "names of all circuit and district court judges
studied for the report, along with a breakdown of each respec-
tive judge's sentences studied for the report by the crime com-
mitted and the race of the defendant."144 Both the AOC and
Louisville denied the request on different grounds. 145 Because
Louisville had a Certificate, we focus on its arguments. Louis-
ville asserted its Certificate independently and as incorporated
through state public records law, KRS 61.878(1)(k), which au-
thorizes the state to withhold information when its disclosure is
prohibited under federal laws or regulations. 146 The NAACP
argued that Louisville's Certificate did not shield the data from
disclosure because it was derived from publicly accessible court
137. Louisville Branch-Nat'l Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored Peo-
ple, 06-ORD-094 Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. (2006) [hereinafter Op. Ky. Att'y Gen.]
(open records decision).
138. Id. at 2.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 3.
141. Id. at 3 & n.2.
142. Id. at 1.
143. Id. at 1-2.
144. Id. at 1.
145. Id. at 1-2.
146. Id. at 4, 9.
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records. 147 It also raised some technical challenges, questioning
whether a behavioral study qualified for a Certificate, as well
raising questions about its effective date. 148 Louisville respond-
ed to each of the technical challenges the NAACP raised. In its
opinion, the Attorney General found that the Certificate was
controlling. 149 After consulting with NIH legal counsel about
the Certificate, the Attorney General was persuaded that the
Certificate was legally in force for the study.150 Because it was
valid, the Attorney General (AG) concluded that "[i]t therefore
provides absolute protection against compelled disclosure of
identifying information about the subjects of the study."1 51 The
AG goes on to indicate that "Louisville amply demonstrates the
disputed data consists of 'identifying information,"' relying on
the FAQ of the NIH website for the definition of "identifying" as
"any other item or combination of data about a research partic-
ipant which could reasonably lead, directly or indirectly by ref-
erence to other information, to identification of that research
subject." 152 Louisville had provided information demonstrating
how someone could piece information from the data with pub-
licly available documents to identify the judges. 153 Based on
this information, the AG concluded: "To require involuntary
disclosure of the disputed data would be tantamount to breach-
ing the protection afforded by the certificate through release of
a combination of data about research subjects that could rea-
sonably lead, directly or indirectly by reference to other infor-
mation, to the identification of those subjects." 154
In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liability Liti-
gation.15 5 This case consolidates numerous products liability
147. Certainly, some of the information was publicly available. However,
based on prior case law, the Attorney General found that the compilation of
data derived from the AOC's records were not public records subject to the
state open records. Id. at 6-9. The conclusion that the records were not public
records further supports the Attorney General's finding that the Certificate
protected the data that AOC shared with Louisville.
148. Id. at 3-4.
149. Id. at 8.
150. Id. at 10 n.11.
151. Id. at 11.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 12.
155. Order Re: Motion to Quash Subpoenas Re Yale Study's Hospital Rec-
ords, In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liability Litigation, No. 1407
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claims against drug manufacturers alleging that PPA con-
tained in their products caused hemorrhagic stroke into a sin-
gle, multi-district litigation (MDL). The MDL defendants sub-
poenaed 32 hospitals seeking records of 27 research
participants from the Hemorrhagic Stroke Project. 15 6 Yale Uni-
versity had already produced data and underlying materials re-
lated to the study, including redacted versions of medical rec-
ords. 157 The MDL defendants were seeking additional medical
records about the participants from the hospitals that provided
them to the Yale researchers. 15 8 According to the Court, the de-
fendants requested redactions generally mirroring those con-
ducted on the documents received from Yale (i.e., name; social
security number; street address; last four digits of telephone
number; family member names; birthday; doctors' names;
etc.). 159
Yale moved to quash the subpoenas on the grounds that
the Certificate protected the data.160 Although defendants indi-
cated a willingness to accept redacted data, Yale argued it "is
not confident the general redaction indication in the subpoenas
suffices or that the redaction would be completed thoroughly
and properly." 161 Yale pointed out that the subpoenas referred
only to certain information being redacted and did not require a
uniform redaction protocol (and asked the Court to impose a
uniform redaction protocol if the subpoenas are enforced). 162
Yale further noted the participants' expectations of privacy and
the chilling effect on future research. 163 That is, that providing
full access to medical records might dissuade others in the fu-
ture from participating in studies. 164
In response, the MDL defendants made several arguments;
we focus only those relevant to the Certificate. First, they dis-
puted the concerns regarding patient confidentiality because
they are requesting only redacted information, which they ar-
gued is consistent with a previous agreement with Yale, which
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 19, 2002).








164. Id. at 12.
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had already produced information. 165 Defendants further ar-
gued that participants understood that others would have ac-
cess to their records, and that the promise of protection was on-
ly to their identities, which is what the Certificate requires. 166
Moreover, defendants contended that their subpoenas were
narrowly tailored to request the records of the 27 cases who
participated in the study and to which the stroke project inves-
tigators had access. 167 Yale's earlier production undermined its
claim of a chilling effect. 168
In its order on the motion to quash, the Court focused on
the defendants' rights under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26
and the broad discovery permitted under it, rather than on the
terms of the Certificate. 169 It concluded that the records that
Yale had in the study or the records that supported the sum-
mary information sent to it are "unquestionably relevant."170
The Court also concluded that "the confidentiality agreements
already associated with those relevant documents, taken to-
gether with defendants' requests for redaction, mitigates any
concern with respect to issues of confidentiality." 171 The Court
agreed there should be a uniform redaction protocol and that
the subpoenas should be narrowed to specify only medical rec-
ords relevant to the stroke project, rather than other pa-
tients. 172 In addressing the chilling effect argument, the court
noted that "[t]he HSP [Hemorrhagic Stroke Project] has been
concluded for some time, many thousands of HSP-related doc-
uments have been produced to date, and the patients involved
in the HSP agreed to the disclosure of their relevant medical
records, so long as any identifying information was redact-
ed." 173
In re PremPro Products Liability Litigation.174 This case is








173. Id. at 3-4.
174. Confidentiality Order Re WHI Study Data, In re PremPro Products




another set of products liability cases alleging that the hormone
replacement therapy drug, PremPro, caused cancer. The rele-
vant action for our purposes involved a request for a dataset
from the Women's Health Initiative (WHI) study, which in-
cludes 161,000 postmenopausal women at 49 clinical sites
throughout the United States.175 Fred Hutchinson Cancer Re-
search Center (FHCRC) is the Clinical Coordinating Center
and has the data from all the collaborating sites. 176 FHCRC, at
the National Institutes of Health's direction, produced data in
2002 in the litigation after redacting identifying information
according to a National Heart, Lung and Blood Institute proto-
col. 177 Wyeth sought additional information and ultimately
moved to compel production. 178 Wyeth agreed that any produc-
tion is subject to a confidentiality order "that bars Wyeth and
any other recipient of the data in the litigation from attempting
to identify the WHI study participants." 179
In its opposition to Wyeth's motion, FHCRC indicated it
asked Wyeth to enter into a protective order, "allowing data re-
sponsive to Wyeth's subpoenas to be used in the litigation,
while protecting the privacy of the study participants; ensuring
the contractual rights of FHCRC and its investigators in publi-
cation of study results; and complying with its contractual re-
sponsibilities to the National Institutes of Health ("NIH")."180 It
also made an argument about burden, suggesting that it re-
move additional information (by hand), including Clinical Cen-
ter Identification to protect participant identities because such
175. Memorandum in Opposition to Wyeth's Motion to Compel and Motion
for Protective Order Re Production of Records by Fred Hutchinson Cancer Re-
search Center, a Non-Party Witness at 2, In re PremPro Products Liability
Litigation, No. 4:03-CV-01507-WRW (E.D. Ark. Nov. 30, 2004) at 2 [hereinaf-
ter FHCRC memorandum].
176. Id.
177. Id. at 4.
178. Motion to Compel Production of Documents from the National Insti-
tutes of Health and the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, In re
PremPro Products Liability Litigation, No. 4:03-CV-01507-WRW (E.D. Ark.
Nov. 12, 2004).
179. Id. at 1.
180. FHCRC memorandum, supra note 175, at 1. It is worth noting that
FHCRC's "Issue Presented" focused on whether there should be a protective
order before production, rather than on the protections afforded by the Certifi-
cate, and that its legal argument about the Certificate's protections appeared
on page fifteen of a twenty-four-page memorandum and was only one para-
graph long. Id. at 15.
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information could be used to re-identify participants. 181 Wyeth
disputed this claim of possible re-identification and further
noted that the parties had been negotiating a protective order
that would prohibit Wyeth from seeking to re-identify partici-
pants. 182 FHCRC's other arguments included the right of WHI
investigators to reap the benefit of publishing their work and
the potential chilling effect on future research if information is
disclosed.183
In response to the motion to compel, the court ordered pro-
duction of data, but with a protective order that provided that
the data "will not contain such participant identifiers as are re-
quired to be deleted by the National Heart, Lung and Blood In-
stitute policy for preparation, release and public distribution of
public use data; the certificate of confidentiality; and state and
federal law."184 Anyone receiving the data had to sign the Con-
ditions of Disclosure form. 185 Use was limited to the litigation,
people receiving the data could not publish the data until pub-
lished by the WHI investigators, and were required to return or
destroy the data at the end of the litigation. 186 The order did
not contain an agreement prohibiting attempts to re-identify
participants.
Dummit v. CSX Transportation, Inc. 187 In this case, cur-
rent and former employees of CSX Transportation Inc. (CSX)
alleged workplace chemical exposures caused their injuries.
CSX subpoenaed magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) results
from Mark Haut, Ph.D. at West Virginia University for use in
its defense.188 These results were from a study about occupa-
tional exposures conducted by Dr. Haut and funded by the Na-
181. Id. at 6.
182. Motion to Compel Production of Documents from the National Insti-
tutes of Health and the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center at 2, In re
PremPro Products Liability Litigation, No. 4:03-CV-01507-WRW (E.D. Ark.
Dec. 8, 2004).
183. FHCRC memorandum, supra note 175, at 7-8.
184. Order, supra note 174, at 1.
185. Id. at 1.
186. Id. at 1-3.
187. Dummit v. CSX Transport, Inc., No. 01-C-145 (Cir. Ct. W. Va. Nov.
21, 2006) (on file with authors).
188. Response of Defendant CSX Transportation, Inc. to Combined Motion
to Quash Subpoena and Motion for Protective Order at 2-3, Dummit v. CSX




tional Institute for Occupational Safety and Health and Cen-
ters for Disease Control and Prevention. 189 Dr. Haut's study
had obtained a Certificate and sought to quash the subpoena
based on its protections, as well as state law grounds.190 CSX
countered that the Certificate did not apply because CSX did
not seek any subject-identifying information. 191 As it described,
it sought "access only to the underlying data after it is stripped
of identifiers."192 Although a hearing on the motion to quash
was scheduled before a state Circuit Court Judge on December
7, 2006, the court did not address the Certificate's protection
because the parties arrived at the hearing having resolved the
dispute. 193 The parties agreed that Dr. Haut would produce
most of the requested data to an independent researcher after
he "anonymized" the data. 194 As described by the parties, the
thirty-one data sets would contain no identifiers, but would on-
ly reference whether they were a case or control.195 In addition,
they agreed to limit disclosure of the data. 196 They further ex-
pressed their intention to document the agreement following
the hearing.197
Juvenile court case.198 In this case, the Connecticut Com-
missioner of the Department of Children and Families filed an
application for temporary custody of four children, which was
granted. 199 The children had participated in two research pro-
jects conducted at Yale and protected by a Certificate. 200 One
study evaluated an intervention for children in out-of-home
care because of abuse and neglect and the other evaluated
189. Id. at 2-3.
190. Combined Motion to Quash and Motion for a Protective Order at 9-12,
Dummit v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 01-C-145 (Cir. Ct. W. Va. Nov. 6, 2006)
(on file with authors).
191. Response, supra note 188, at 7.
192. Id. However, there were only about thirty participants/CSX employ-
ees.
193. Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Quash/Motion for Protective Order
at 3, Dummit v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 01-C-145 (Cir. Ct. W. Va. Dec. 7,
2006) (on file with authors).
194. Id. at 4.
195. Id. at 4-5.
196. Id. at 6.
197. Id. at 9.
198. Memoradum of Decision on Motion to Quash, Connecticut Superior
Court for Juvenile Matters (Jud. Dist. Hartford July 1, 2003) [hereinafter
Memoradum of Decision].
199. Id. at 1.
200. Id. at 2.
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stress on brain development.201 The Department of Children
and Families (the Department) subpoenaed those records, con-
tending that the records were necessary to providing appropri-
ate medical treatment to the children. 202 The Department
learned about the children's study participation from Yale re-
searchers when they voluntarily notified the Department of
concerns about the children's welfare. 203 The opinion in this
case resulted from Yale's motion to quash the subpoena.
Yale made two arguments in favor of its motion to quash:
first, the records were protected by a Certificate and, thus, are
"privileged, confidential and protected from disclosure under
federal law," and, second, that disclosure would violate public
policy. 204 In response, the Department argued that the statutes
authorizing Certificates do not prohibit disclosure of the rec-
ords, that Yale waived any protection, and that the Yale re-
searchers were mandated reporters and so must "fully disclose"
any information in its possession related to child abuse. 205
The Court ultimately agreed with the Department's inter-
pretation of the Certificate statute that it only prohibited Yale
from disclosing the names and other information from which
the identity of the subjects can be ascertained, not the underly-
ing records. 206 The Court determined that three cases that dis-
cuss 42 U.S.C. § 241(d), People v. Newman, People v. Still, and
Murphy v. Phillip Morris Inc., support the Department's argu-
ment because each court focused on the prohibition of disclo-
sure of identifying information, not the records themselves. 207
The Court noted that, to the extent it is unclear whether 42
U.S.C. § 241(d) "is intended to protect only the identity of re-
search subjects or the substance of the research," Connecticut
courts would defer to a federal agency's interpretation of the
statute. 208 Based on its review of the implementing regulations,
the Court decided these, too, support the Department's inter-
pretation that they apply only to identifying information, not
201. Id. at 1 n.1.
202. Id. at 2.
203. Id. at 9, 11.
204. Id. at 2.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 3.
207. Id. at 6.
208. Id. at 7.
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the records in question.209
Critically, in this case, both sides agreed that "Yale in-
formed the department that the children were participating in
its research project,"210 and the court agreed with the Depart-
ment's contention that this disclosure constituted a waiver of
the Certificates' protections. 211 The Court concluded that the
Department's position is supported by People v. Still, which, ac-
cording to the court, stands for the proposition that "the subject
of a research study may waive his or her right to remain anon-
ymouS"212 and the regulations (and the Certificate language),
which allow the researcher to voluntarily disclose identifying
characteristics of research subjects in certain circumstances,
e.g., child abuse. 213 From this, the Court concluded "[t]he regu-
lations and the certificates thus imply that the subject as well
as the entity and individual conducting a research program
may waive the right to refuse to disclose identifying infor-
mation."214 Because Yale voluntarily disclosed to the Depart-
ment that the children were participating in the research pro-
jects, the Court concluded that Yale has waived its right to
refuse to disclose identifying information to the Department. 215
Yale also asserted that disclosing the records would violate
public policy because it would have a chilling effect on public
participation in research. 216 This policy is recognized in Murphy
v. Philip Morris Inc., as well as People v. Newman. However,
the court noted that, "[i]n circumstances such as this, however,
where allegations of child abuse are involved, another public
policy [protecting children from abuse and neglect] is also im-
plicated." 217 This Court agreed that the policy of protecting the
identity and records of research subjects must "give way to the
extent necessary to accommodate the dominant public policy of
protecting children," which it argued was consistent with the
balancing courts have made in other contexts involving confi-
209. Id. at 8-9.
210. Id. at 9.
211. Ironically, the researchers informed the Department about the chil-
dren's participation in the study because they sought to protect them; they had
concerns about "the ability of the children's mother to care for them." Id. at 9.
212. Id. at 10.
213. Id. at 9-11.
214. Id. at 10.
215. Id. at 11.
216. Id. at 14.
217. Id. at 14-15.
2013] 45
46 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 14:1
dentiality versus child protection.218
In ordering Yale to provide the Department with the re-
quested documents, the Court provided some confidentiality
protections; it restricted the use of the records to providing
treatment for the children, required Yale to redact the names
and other identifying information from other research partici-
pants and their parents,219 and prohibited the Department
from seeking to re-identify any research subject or to disclose
information about them. 220 It is unclear from the Memorandum
why the Department needed the research records, given that it
had already obtained temporary custody of the children and,
thus, was in a position to provide medical treatment.
Experiences reported by institutional counsel. As reported
in more detail elsewhere, 221 institutional legal counsel have de-
scribed in interviews experiences similar to those reflected in
the cases described above. 222 Most counsel (20/24) had experi-
ence with legal demands for research data, and almost two-
thirds reported having experience with legal demands for re-
search data protected by a Certificate. 223 Most cases that coun-
sel described were civil, not criminal, ones. 224 Overall, counsel
reported that they generally were able to resolve cases without
218. Id. at 16. Of course, the researchers' recognized the interest in protect-
ing the children in contacting the Department about their concerns. Although
we do not have access to the consent form in this case, researchers who obtain
a Certificate are required to include any circumstances in which they will re-
veal identifiable information in the consent form. 42 C.F.R. § 2a.4(j) (2011)
(discussed in Part 1I.B). See also the sample consent language in Detailed
Application Instructions for Certificate of Confidentiality: Extramural
Research Projects, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES,
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/coc/appl-extramural.htm (last updated Dec.
23, 2009). In doing so, they typically indicate that they will reveal information
about the abuse, but not everything that they have learned about the
participant through the study. See, e.g., Consent Process-Certificate of Confi-
dentiality, S.F. COMM. ON HuM. RES., http://www.research.ucsf.edu/
chr/Recruit/chrConsentCertConf.asp (last updated Aug. 1, 2011).
219. It is not clear from the Court's Memorandum of Decision whether the
Department sought access to records beyond the four children over whom the
Department had temporary custody. Unfortunately, we do not have access to
the parties' papers to help answer this question.
220. Memorandum of Decision, supra note 198, at 17.
221. Wolf et al., supra note 17.
222. Id. The results are based on semi-structured interviews with twenty-
four institutional legal counsel.
223. Id. at 3.
224. Id.
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going to court and without disclosure of identifiable data.225
Counsel described multiple strategies they had successfully
used in protecting research data. In some cases, simply inform-
ing opposing counsel about the Certificate was sufficient. 226 In
others, counsel were able to persuade the requesting attorney
to obtain the information from other sources. 227 In some cases,
counsel negotiated disclosure of nonidentifiable data.228 Even
when required to go to court, counsel indicated that they were
often successful in protecting the data, although they typically
relied on other legal protections, rather than the Certificate. 229
E. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CASES
Several lessons can be taken away from our review of the
cases we uncovered-reported and unreported-involving Cer-
tificates. First, the cases and the experiences of counsel suggest
that Certificates generally function as intended. Counsel often
are able to avoid both production of data and court fights over
production, by informing the requesting counsel about the Cer-
tificate and its protections. When data are produced, typically
only limited data are produced to avoid identification 230; such
production is consistent with the Certificate's protection, alt-
hough perhaps not with people's ordinary understanding of the
protections. 231
Second, despite this overall reassuring picture of data pro-
225. Id.




230. See, e.g., supra notes 155, 174, 187. This is what happened in the PPA,
Prempro, and CSX cases, as well as in cases described by counsel in our inter-
views. As described in these cases, a protective order typically was also issued
with additional confidentiality obligations, such as limiting access to the data
and promising not to reidentify subjects using other available data. However,
such protections may not always be sufficient. One counsel in our interviews
described a circumstance in which research data (not protected by a Certifi-
cate) was ordered produced in a deidentified form, but where the counsel felt
deidentification was not truly feasible because of the small number of subjects
(under twenty) and the specificity of the data collected (unpublished data).
Wolf et al., supra note 17.
231. In our interviews with legal counsel, one respondent described learn-
ing that the Certificate protects only identifiable data, "contrary to some peo-
ple's assumptions." Wolf et al., supra note 17, at 4. Some IRB Chairs reflected
the assumption that the Certificate protected all data, with one describing a
researcher with a Certificate as being "free of the obligation to deliver data in
a lawsuit." Institutional Review Board, supra note 22, at 5.
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tection, the cases reveal some important areas of concern. Sig-
nificantly, the cases reveal some uncertainty and confusion
about Certificates and their protections. Specifically, despite
the strong statutory language, it appears that when research
data are sought, counsel and judges do not start by considering
whether the Certificate protects the data, but rather simply
view the Certificate as one aspect among many to be consid-
ered; although the statutory language sounds definitive, coun-
sel and judges do not approach Certificates that way. For ex-
ample, in the PremPro case, Fred Hutchinson's lawyers raised
the Certificate's protection as their third legal argument in the
memorandum in opposition to Wyeth's motion to compel.232
Similarly, the Bradley court did not even address the Certifi-
cate's protections, having decided the issue on ordinary discov-
ery concepts of materiality.233 This approach, perhaps, is not so
surprising given that lawyers encounter few Certificate cases in
their careers and may not be too familiar with them.234 Given
how few cases go to court, judges are even less likely to encoun-
ter Certificates and, therefore, may be likely to approach de-
mands for research data the same way they approach other dis-
covery disputes about sensitive, confidential data. However,
this apparent hesitancy to raise the Certificate as a primary
argument to protect data may also reflect uncertainty about
whether courts will uphold a Certificate's protection. In inter-
views, counsel certainly expressed concerns about the strength
of the protections and reluctance to assert the Certificate where
there were other protections on which to rely. As one counsel
explained, "I guess the prevailing thought or position is that we
don't want to challenge [Certificates] in court and set precedent
for the court saying they're not effective."2 35
Finally, judicial treatment of two critical issues related to
the Certificate's protections-waiver and identifiability-in
some cases seem to validate counsels' concerns about how Cer-
tificates will fare in the courts. The two waiver issues that arise
232. FHCRC Memonrandum, supra note 175, at 15. This argument does
not appear until page fifteen of a twenty-four-page memorandum in opposition
to the motion to compel. Id.
233. State v. Bradley, 634 S.E.2d 258, 262 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).
234. Wolf et al., supra note 17, at 3. This lack of familiarity may explain
counsel's reliance on the Certificate as a general confidentiality obligation in




are 1) whether waiver has occurred, and 2) the scope of the
waiver. The first case to address waiver was People v. Still. In
Still, the court had to determine whether the methadone clinic
could assert the Certificate's protections against the district at-
torney's subpoena, when the patient, Still, had already indicat-
ed he was a patient at the clinic and, with Still's permission,
the clinic had provided information confirming his participation
to support his defense. 236 The court appropriately concluded
that Still's disclosure constituted a waiver of the Certificate's
protections, although only with respect to records that would
"aid in determining the veracity of the defendant's claim of law-
ful possession of the methadone found on him." 237 In Still, the
waiver was voluntary, purposeful, and limited in scope.
The opposite is true in the juvenile court case. While it is
true that the researchers' disclosure of the pediatric partici-
pants' identities was voluntary, the waiver of the Certificate's
protections could hardly be said to be voluntary and purposeful,
nor was the waiver limited in scope. The juvenile court judge
interpreted the researchers' disclosure of participant identities
to report child neglect as a waiver of the Certificate's protec-
tions. 238 This interpretation appears inconsistent with both the
researchers' intentions, as evidenced by their motion to quash
the subpoena for the records, 239 and with the intent of the stat-
ute and implementing regulations. Specifically, the statute is
permissive-researchers may withhold identifying characteris-
tics-and the regulations expand on that concept by making it
explicit that the Certificate does not apply to voluntary disclo-
sures. 240 The NIH Certificate kiosk expands on the issue of vol-
untary disclosures in its "frequently asked questions" section,
explaining,
Personally identifiable information protected by a Certificate may be
disclosed under the following circumstances: . . .Voluntary disclosure
by the researcher of information on such things as child abuse, re-
portable communicable diseases . . . possible threat to self or other, or
other voluntary disclosures provided that such disclosures are spelled
out in the informed consent form; Voluntary compliance by the re-
searcher with reporting requirements of state laws, such as
knowledge of communicable disease, provided such intention to report
236. People v. Still, 369 N.Y.S.2d 759, 761 (App. Div. 1975).
237. Id. at 765.
238. Memorandum of Decision, supra note 198, at 11.
239. Id. at 1.
240. See supra Parts IIA, IJ.B (discussing the statutory and regulatory
provisions).
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is specified in the informed consent form. 2 4 1
With respect to communicable disease, NIH policy requires
an agreement to comply with state disease reporting require-
ments in order to receive a Certificate. 242 If disclosure of limited
but identifiable information for reporting purposes waived the
Certificate's protections, this NIH policy would be nonsensical,
because the agreement to report would render the Certificate's
protections meaningless. The court's waiver interpretation cre-
ates a strong disincentive to reporting conditions that the NIH
explicitly requires for disease reporting and encourages for
abuse reporting.
The juvenile court case also highlights some problems con-
cerning the concept of identifiability. In that case, the judge
appears to consider only the identity to be protected. In the
judge's view, once the researchers revealed to the department
the names of four children who were participating in the study,
there was no reason to keep any data relating to them confi-
dential.243 This interpretation appears to be too narrow. Cer-
tainly when Certificates' protections only applied to illegal drug
use, identity was the critical issue. Identifying someone as a
participant revealed sensitive information about them-that is,
that they had engaged in illegal activity. But even then, identi-
ty in and of itself was not the only issue. Rather, it was-and
is-the individual's identity in connection with some other in-
formation (originally, use of illegal drugs) that creates the risk
to participants, and that the statute addresses. This point is re-
inforced in the illegal drug use context by considering that
there are different legal penalties for possessing different types
of drugs, as well as different levels of opprobrium and stigma
attached to such use; for example, marijuana use is judged less
harshly than heroin use. Thus, the harm to a person identified
as participating in a study of illegal drug use could be harmed
further by also revealing specific information about her drug
use. That the connection between the data and the identity is
the important consideration is also evident from the way that
NIH describes research topics that are appropriate for a Certif-
icate's protection, under the current, broader statute. For ex-
241. FAQs on Certificates, supra note 1.
242. Reporting of Communicable Diseases Policy, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH &
HuliM. SERVICES (Aug. 9, 1991), http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/coc/
cd-policy.htm.
243. Memorandum of Decision, supra note 198, at 10.
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ample, NIH lists "[s]tudies that gather information that if re-
leased could be damaging to a participant's financial standing,
employability or reputation within the community; [r]esearch
involving information that might lead to social stigmatization
or discrimination if it were disclosed" as studies eligible for a
Certificate.244
Viewed against this background, the juvenile court's ruling
is inconsistent with the purpose of the Certificate. Moreover, if
other courts were to follow this approach, such decisions could
ultimately stifle the type of research that Certificates are in-
tended to encourage. While it seems likely that the court's in-
terest in protecting the health and well-being of the children
factored into its ultimate decision to require disclosure of the
data, it is not clear that disclosure of the data was necessary to
do so. Indeed, the researchers already had disclosed to the De-
partment of Children and Families their concerns about the
children's welfare, and, as a result, the Department had custo-
dy of the children. 245 It is difficult to understand how, under
such circumstances, the data could enhance the Department's
ability to protect the children; the Department could access
medical records, as well as speak with the children, their doc-
tors, and others who had information about them to get infor-
mation that might help in their care. Moreover, had the re-
searchers understood that identified data would be subject to
compelled disclosure if they reported their concerns, they may
have hesitated to disclose, which would have decreased protec-
tion for the children.
The Attorney General's opinion in In re NAACP v. Univer-
sity of Louisville stands in stark contrast to the juvenile court
case. Rather than focusing solely on identity, the Attorney Gen-
eral recognized that it was being connected to the data collected
that could be harmful to participants because it could result in
them being labeled racist within their community. 246 The At-
torney General also understood that the results produced by
the study were valuable, and could not be obtained unless par-
ticipants felt that they would not be connected to the infor-
mation collected in the study.247 Accordingly, the Attorney
General looked carefully at whether, in combination with other
244. FAQs on Certificates, supra note 1.
245. Memorandum of Decision, supra note 198, at 1, 9.
246. Op. Ky. Att'y Gen., supra note 137, at 10.
247. Id.
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information, the research data could become identifiable in
ways that could be harmful to participants. 248 This more so-
phisticated view recognized limits in our ability to share data
in a deidentified fashion and maintain that deidentification in
today's world. The role of technology in the concept of identifia-
bility is discussed in more detail in Part V.
III. OTHER STATUTORY CONFIDENTIALITY
PROTECTIONS
The HHS Certificate is not the only statutory protection for
research data. There are several other federal protections, alt-
hough they differ in important ways from the Certificate stat-
ute. In addition, states have adopted statutes to protect re-
search data in some circumstances. Like the HHS Certificate,
there are few reported cases involving these statutes.
A. FEDERAL STATUTES
1. Protection of Substance Abuse Records
Statutory protection. As described above, the court in Peo-
ple v. Newman, determined that the 1972 Act did not repeal the
1970 Act with respect to the confidentiality of records. 249 In do-
ing so, the court noted the differences between the protections
afforded by the two acts, including that the 1972 Act did not
need to offer the same "guarantee of anonymity" because it
"covered a wide range of programs and activities [not just re-
search] . . . in which absolute confidentiality was not regarded
as a prerequisite to successful operation of the programs."250
What the 1972 Act did provide in terms of confidentiality was
as follows:
Records of the identity, diagnosis, prognosis, or treatment of any pa-
tient which are maintained in connection with the performance of any
program or activity relating to alcoholism or alcohol abuse education,
training, treatment, rehabilitation, or research, which is conducted,
regulated, or directly or indirectly assisted by any department or
agency of the United States shall .. . be confidential and be disclosed
only for the purposes and under the circumstances expressly author-
ized under subsection (b) of this section. 25 1
248. Id. at 12.
249. People v. Newman, 298 N.E.2d 651, 657 (N.Y. 1973).
250. Id. at 656.
251. Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-255,
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Subsection (b) covered disclosure upon, on the basis of prior
written consent of the patient and without consent for bona fide
medical emergencies, scientific research, management and fi-
nancial audits, and program evaluation, or upon court order
based on a showing of good cause. 252 Subsection (c) specified
that "[e]xcept as authorized by a court order granted under
subsection (b)(2)(C), no record referred to in subsection (a) may
be used to initiate or substantiate any criminal charges against
a patient or to any investigation of a patient."253 Subsection (d)
specified that the prohibitions on disclosure continue after a
person is no longer a patient.254
The statute has been amended multiple times over the
years.255 In 1992, the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health
Administration (ADAMHA) Reorganization Act, 256 broadened
the applicability of the confidentiality protection from "alcohol-
ism and alcohol abuse" programs to "substance abuse." Today
this confidentiality provision is in the U.S. Code at 42 U.S.C.
§ 290 (dd)-2.257
The regulations define "patient identifying information" as
"name, address, social security number, fingerprints, photo-
graph, or similar information by which the identity of a patient
can be determined with reasonable accuracy and speed either
directly or by reference to other publicly available infor-
mation."258 They further explain that the restrictions on disclo-
sure apply to "any information [obtained by a federally assisted
substance abuse program for treatment purpos-
es] . . . which . .. [w]ould identify a patient as an alcohol or
drug abuser either directly, by reference to other publicly
available information, or through verification of such an identi-




255. For example, there were changes to names, effective dates, and other
technical changes in 1974 through Pub. L. No. 93-282, § 303(a), (b), 88 Stat.
137, 138 (1974) and in 1976 through Pub. L. No. 94-237, § 4(c)(5)(A), 90 Stat.
244 (1976) and Pub. L. No. 94-581, § 111(c)(3), 90 Stat. 2852 (1976). The most
pertinent changes for our purposes are as follows: In 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-24,
§ 2(b)(16)(B), 97 Stat. 182 (1983) (codified as 21 U.S.C. § 1175) was transferred
to 42 U.S.C. § 290ee-3. The section was again redesigned in 1987 by Pub. L.
No. 100-77, 101 Stat. 516 to 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2, where it resides today.
256. ADAH1VIA Reorganization Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-321, 106 Stat.
323, 368 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
257. 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2 (2006).
258. 42 C.F.R. § 2.11 (2011).
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fication by another person."259
While the regulations explicitly exempt the restrictions on
disclosure for reporting suspect child abuse or neglect, they go
on to provide that "[h]owever, the restrictions continue to apply
to the original [substance abuse] patient records maintained by
the program including their disclosure and use for civil or crim-
inal proceedings which may arise out of the report of suspected
child abuse and neglect."260 The regulations also make clear
that the protected information can only be used as specified by
the regulations and "may not otherwise be disclosed or used in
any civil, criminal, administrative, or legislative proceedings
conducted by any Federal, State, or local authority."261 They
further specify that "[a]ny answer to a request for disclosure of
patient records which is not permissible under these regula-
tions must be made in a way that will not affirmatively reveal
that an identified individual has been, or is being diagnosed or
treated for [substance abuse]." 262 The regulations also make
clear that, if disclosure is prohibited by the regulations, "no
State law may either authorize or compel" such disclosure. 263
Interestingly, the regulations also address concurrent coverage
under the substance abuse records and the Certificate's protec-
tions and notes that "a court order authorizing a disclosure of
information about a patient [under these regulations] does not
affect the exercise of authority under [the Certificate]."264 The
regulations also specify the procedures and criteria for court
orders authorizing disclosure under the regulations. 265
Case interpretation. The earlier version of the records pro-
tection was at issue in Anastasi v. Moregenthau.266 In July,
1975, a patient at a New York state drug rehabilitation center
made statements to Anastasi, a narcotics parole officer at the
center, about her involvement in a murder that the New York
City Policy Department was then investigating.267 At Anasta-
si's request, she repeated the statements before other parole of-
259. 42 C.F.R. § 2.12(a).
260. 42 C.F.R. § 2.12(c)(6).
261. 42 C.F.R. § 2.13(a)(1).
262. 42 C.F.R. § 2.13(c)(2).
263. 42 C.F.R. §2.20.
264. 42 C.F.R. § 2.21(b).
265. 42 C.F.R. §§ 2.64-67.
266. Anastasi v. Moregenthau, 373 N.Y.S.2d 751 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975).
267. Id. at 752.
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ficers who, at her request, notified the police. 268 Later, the pa-
tient confessed to a homicide detective and an assistant district
attorney her complicity in the murder with another, whom she
named as the actual killer.269 The patient agreed to testify be-
fore the grand jury and cooperate in the prosecution of the kill-
er in exchange for permission to plead guilty to a lesser
charge.270 Subsequently, her attorney determined that her ini-
tial statements actually exculpated her, and he and the patient
refused to continue their cooperation with the prior arrange-
ment.271 The prosecutor then issued subpoenas to the parole of-
ficers who heard the initial statements. 272
The parole officers moved to quash the subpoenas based on
the protections afforded to drug treatment records under 21
U.S.C. § 1175.273 The court compelled the parole officers to ap-
pear before the grand jury because it found that their testimo-
ny did not constitute "records of the identity, diagnosis, progno-
sis, or treatment."274 It concluded that the protection did not
extend to a "gratuitous confession of criminal activity," which
was "unrelated to 'identity, diagnosis, prognosis, or treat-
ment."'275
The court distinguished the case from People v. Newman,
because, unlike in Newman, the identity of the patient and her
status as a patient was known-indeed, the patient herself had
"repeatedly revealed and discussed it with the police and prose-
cutors." 276 The court also found that the patient had waived her
right of confidentiality by her express request that parole offic-
ers disclose her statements to the police, her repetition of her
statement to authorities, and her discussion with those author-
ities of her conversations with petitioners.277
2. Protection of Federal Research Data
In addition to the topic-specific statutory protections that






273. Id. at 753.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 753-54.
276. Id. at 754.
277. Id. (citing People v. Still, 369 N.Y.S.2d 759 (N.Y. App. Div.1975)).
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icate protections, there are several federal statutes that protect
data for research that is conducted by the federal government
or on behalf of the federal government.278
Department of Justice (42 U.S.C. § 3789g). 42 U.S.C.
§ 3789g protects confidentiality of records related to justice sys-
tem improvement. It provides:
No officer or employee of the Federal Government, and no recipient of
assistance under the provisions of this chapter shall use or reveal any
research or statistical information furnished under this chapter by
any person and identifiable to any specific private person for any pur-
pose other than the purpose for which it was obtained in accordance
with this chapter. Such information and copies thereof shall be im-
mune from legal process, and shall not, without the consent of the
person furnishing such information, be admitted as evidence or used
for any purpose in any action, suit, or other judicial, legislative, or
administrative proceedings.279
Similar confidentiality provisions first appeared in 42
U.S.C. § 3771.280 The Chapter was revised in 1979, resulting in
the current section. 281 There have been few cases interpreting
the protections, although there are a number of Ohio cases that
authorize withholding records from production because of the
statute's protections. 282
278. In this section, we identify three separate protections involving differ-
ent federal entities. Two of these (the DOJ and AHRQ) are mentioned in the
frequently asked questions on the NIH Certificate Kiosk. FAQs on Certificates,
supra note 1. The third (CDC) is mentioned in connection with the AHRQ
statute. Other federal departments and agencies may offer similar protections
for research conducted by and with them. For example, there are limits on use
and publication of census information. 13 U.S.C. § 9 (2006). Our discussion is
not meant to be exhaustive.
279. 42 U.S.C. § 3789g(a) (2006).
280. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-
351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968).
281. Justice System Improvement Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-157, § 818,
93 Stat. 1167, 1213 (1979). For current version, see 42 U.S.C. § 3789g (2006).
There have been minor amendments in 1984 and 2006, which did not affect
the substance. See Pub.L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837; Violence Against Women
and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162,
119 Stat. 2960.
282. See, e.g., State ex rel. Multimedia, Inc. v. Snowden, 647 N.E.2d 1374
(Ohio 1995); State ex rel. Johnson v. City of Cleveland, 603 N.E.2d 1011 (Ohio
1992). But cf. State ex rel. Attorney Gen.v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 629 P.2d
330 (N.M.1981) (stating that investigation documents were not protected be-
cause the statute covers records supported by federal funds and federal funds
were awarded only after investigation was completed). There are also a num-
ber of cases ruling that there is no private right of action for violation of the
statute, primarily relying on the analysis in Polchowski v. Gorris, 714 F.2d
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Agency for Healthcare Quality and Research (42 U.S.C.
§ 299c-3). AHRQ provides statutory protection for identifiable
information collected by the agency as follows:
(c) Limitation on use of certain information. No information, if an es-
tablishment or person supplying the information or described in it is
identifiable, obtained in the course of activities undertaken or sup-
ported under this subchapter may be used for any purpose other than
the purpose for which it was supplied unless such establishment or
person has consented (as determined under regulations of the Direc-
tor) to its use for such other purpose. Such information may not be
published or released in other form if the person who supplied the in-
formation or who is described in it is identifiable unless such person
has consented (as determined under regulations of the Director) to its
publication or release in other form. 2 8 3
This statute has not changed since the law was originally
passed in 1999 when AHRQ was created. 284 It replaced an iden-
tical statute to protect identifiable information, 42 U.S.C. §
299al-(c), passed in 1989 during the creation of AHRQ's prede-
cessor agency, the Agency for Health Care Policy and Re-
search. 285
There is nothing in the legislative history to expand upon
the protections afforded by the AHRQ statute. However, in
2001, AHRQ issued a Memorandum on Statutory Confidentiali-
ty Protection of Research Data on its website that describes the
AHRQ statute in detail and how it should be interpreted.286 As
described in the memorandum, AHRQ reads: "this Federal
mandate, to keep confidential all identifiable research data col-
lected pursuant to AHRQ's authorizing legislation ... and not
to disclose any of this identifiable data without the consent of
the supplier of the data or of the subject individuals, as apply-
ing to anyone with access to that collected data."287
The Agency interprets the restrictions of the statute as at-
taching themselves to "any identifiable research data once it
has been collected pursuant to AHRQ-supported programs or
749 (7th Cir. 1983).
283. 42 U.S.C. §299c-3(c) (2006).
284. Healthcare Research and Quality Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-129,
§ 2(a), 113 Stat. 1667 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.
(2006)).
285. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, §
6103(a), 103 Stat. 2106, 2189.
286. Memorandum from Susan Greene Merewitz, Senior Attorney, Agency
for Healthcare Research & Quality, to Nancy Foster, Coordinator for Quality
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projects."288 The terms of the statute are also not time-
limited-the obligation of protection does not end, even if the
original statute is replaced. 289 The memorandum acknowledges
the lack of a legal challenge of the AHRQ statute, but also
notes examples of potential legal challenges and that the CDC
has taken steps to avoid potential legal problems by negotiating
solutions with parties to avoid a violation of its similar statute
discussed below. 290
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (42 U.S.C.§ 242m). The CDC provides an Assurance of Confidentiality,
which protects identifiable data collected by it:
(d) Information; publication restrictions. No information, if an estab-
lishment or person supplying the information or described in it is
identifiable, obtained in the course of activities undertaken or sup-
ported under section 242b, 242k, or 2421 of this title may be used for
any purpose other than the purpose for which it was supplied unless
such establishment or person has consented (as determined under
regulations of the Secretary) to its use for such other purpose; and in
the case of information obtained in the course of health statistical or
epidemiological activities under section 242b or 242k of this title, such
information may not be published or released in other form if the par-
ticular establishment or person supplying the information or de-
scribed in it is identifiable unless such establishment or person has
consented (as determined under regulations of the Secretary) to its
publication or release in other form. 2 9 1
This CDC statute was included in the authorizing statute
for the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) in
1974.292 While there is extensive legislative history pertaining
to the creation of the NCHS, the discussion of the confidentiali-
ty provisions is limited. A 1978 committee report addressing
statutory amendments noted the purpose of these restrictions
on disclosure:
The committee is especially concerned about individual rights to pri-
vacy and the confidentiality of individual medical records or of any in-
formation which might be collected, maintained, published, or re-
leased in some other individually identifiable form. It is the
committee's intent that any activities conducted under the authority
of this act shall be in conformance with section 308(d) of the [PHSA]




291. 42 U.S.C. § 242m (2006).
292. Health Services Research, Health Statistics, and Medical Libraries
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-353, § 107(a), 88 Stat. 362, 368.
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ties which submit data. In addition, the Secretary may not use any in-
formation obtained for any other purpose than the purpose for which
it was supplied unless the individual or entity is so notified.2 9 3
Section (d) has been modified three times since the original
authorizing statute. In 1978, "statistical or epidemiological ac-
tivities" was substituted for "statistical activities." 294 The stat-
ute originally applied to all information collected by the agency,
but was modified in 1983, to information "if an establishment
or person supplying the information or described in it is identi-
fiable." 295 Finally, in 1989, §§ 242c and 242n of the PHSA were
removed from the section because both of these statutes were
repealed the same year.296 The reasons for these changes are
not discussed in the congressional reports.
Summary. These statutes differ from the Certificate au-
thorizing statute in a couple of important ways. First, they do
not require that a researcher apply for the protections. Rather,
the protections attach to all research within the scope of the
statute. Second, they apply to all of the data collected, not just
identifiable data. Accordingly, this avoids some of the problems
arising with data that is not identifiable, but may, when cou-
pled with other information, be identifying.
B. STATE STATUTES
A number of states have adopted statutes to protect re-
search data from compelled disclosure. Some of these statutes
are similar to the AHRQ, CDC, and DOJ statutes described in
Part III.A above, in that they broadly protect data from re-
search conducted by or for a state agency. For example, Mary-
land's statute protects records "assembled or obtained for re-
search or study"297 in the custody and control of "(i) The Drug
Abuse Administration, if that administration assembled or ob-
tained the confidential record; (ii) The AIDS Administration, if
that Administration assembled or obtained the confidential
record; or (iii) The Secretary or an agent or employee of the
293. S. REP. 95-839, 12, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9088, 9099.
294. Health Services Research, Health Statistics, and Health Care Tech-
nology Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-623, §§ 2, 6(d), 8(b), 92 Stat. 3443, 3451,
3455.
295. Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, § 8(c), 96 Stat. 2049, 2060
(1983).
296. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239,
§ 6103(e)(4), 103 Stat. 2106, 2206.
297. MD. CODE. ANN., Health-General § 4-101, 72 (LexisNexis 2009). The
records must also name or "otherwise identif[y] any person." Id.
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Secretary, if the Secretary assembled or obtained the confiden-
tial record" and limits use "only for the research and the study
for which it was assembled or obtained" and disclosure "to any
person who is not engaged in the research or study project."298
The statute does permit publication of information "that sum-
marizes or refers to confidential records in the aggregate, with-
out disclosing the identity of any person who is the subject of
the confidential record." 299 A Maryland appeals court held that
the department could not withhold the identity of a restaurant
from which the requester may have acquired Hepatitis A under
this statute. 300 The case turned on whether a "case investiga-
tion" of Hepatitis transmission constituted "research" or a
"study" under the statute.301 The court ultimately concluded
that the Department erred in denying the individual's entire
request under the statute, but recognized that some records
might be protected under this and another statute.302 At no
point did the court question that the Department could protect
research records, as provided under the statute.
Similarly, North Dakota protects
all information, records of interviews, written reports, statements,
notes, memoranda, or other data procured by the state department of
health, in connection with studies conducted by the state department
of health, or carried on by the department jointly with other persons,
agencies, or organizations, or procured by such other persons, agen-
cies, or organizations, for the purpose of reducing the morbidity or
mortality from any cause or condition of health [providing that they
are] confidential and must be used solely for the purposes of medical
or scientific research.3 0 3
The statute further provides that the protected information "is
not admissible as evidence in any action of any kind in any
court or before any other tribunal, board, agency, or person,"
although data may be disclosed as necessary "for the purpose of
furthering the research project to which they relate."304
South Dakota protects "[a]ll information, interviews, re-
298. MD. CODE. ANN., Health-General § 4-102(a), 72 (LexisNexis 2009).
Similar provisions were originally enacted in 1963. Haigley v. Dep't of Health
& Mental Hygiene, 736 A.2d 1185, 1197 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999).
299. MD. CODE. ANN., Health-General § 4-102(b) (LexisNexis 2009).
300. Haigley, 736 A.2d at 1203.
301. Id. at 1187-88.
302. Id. at 1203.
303. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-01-15(1) (2012).
304. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-01-15(2) (2012).
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ports, statements, memoranda, or other data procured by the
Department of Health, South Dakota State Medical Associa-
tion, allied medical societies, or in-hospital staff committees of
accredited hospitals in the course of a medical study for the
purpose of reducing morbidity or mortality," providing that
such information "shall be strictly confidential and shall only
be used for medical research."305 It further provides that "[s]uch
information ... shall not be admissible as evidence in any ac-
tion of any kind in any court or before any tribunal, board,
agency, or person."306 Washington generally protects research
records, providing that
[n]o research professional who has established an individually identi-
fiable research record from personal record information ... or who has
established a research record from data or information voluntarily
provided by an agency client or employee under a written confidenti-
ality assurance for the explicit purpose of research, may disclose such
a record in individually identifiable form unless:
1) the person or his or her legally authorized representa-
tive consents; 2) disclosure is necessary to prevent or minimize
injury, only the information necessary to protect is disclosed,
and the disclosure is limited to select people; 3) for audit pur-
poses authorized by law; or 4) pursuant to a search warrant or
court order.307 The latter is limited to circumstances where the
record will be used
solely for the purpose of facilitating inquiry into an alleged violation
of law by the research professional using the record for a research
purpose or by the agency; and ... [a]ny research record obtained [by
warrant or order] and any information directly or indirectly derived
from the research records shall remain confidential to the extent pos-
sible and shall not be used as evidence in an administrative, judicial,
or legislative proceeding except against the research professional us-
ing the record for a research purpose or against the state agency. 3 0 8
On the other hand, other states have adopted protections
that are specific to certain types of research, rather than re-
search conducted by or for a particular state agency. The topics
tend to be for research involving potentially stigmatizing condi-
tions, such as mental health, HIV/AIDS, and genetics. For ex-
305. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-14-1 (2011). The state's authority to protect
some state records, including this protection of medical research records, was
noted in Doe v. Nelson, 680 N.W.2d 302, 310 n.9 (S.D. 2004) (holding that the
Governor did not have authority to seal pardons granted directly by the Gov-
ernor).
306. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-14-1 (2011).
307. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.48.040 (West 2006).
308. Id.
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ample, Hawaii provides that
[a]ny findings, conclusions, or summaries resulting from medical
studies within the scope of [mental health and mental retardation
studies] shall not be used or made available in any legal proceeding.
Any information provided to any research or study committee shall
not be used or made available in any legal proceeding unless it is un-
obtainable from the original source. In such event, the judicial officer
shall in chambers inspect the committee's findings, conclusions, or
summaries and make available factual information contained there-
in.3 0 9
California provides that
[r]esearch records, in a personally identifying form, developed or ac-
quired by any person in the course of conducting research or a re-
search study relating to HIV or AIDS shall be confidential, and these
confidential records shall not be disclosed by any person in possession
of the research record, nor shall these confidential records be discov-
erable, nor shall any person be compelled to produce any confidential
research record, except as provided by this chapter. 3 10
Arkansas and Oklahoma prohibit disclosure of data from
genetic research.311 Specifically, the Arkansas statute provides
that
(a) No research records of individual subjects in genetic research
studies shall be: (1) Subject to subpoena or discovery in civil suits, ex-
cept in cases in which the information in the records is the basis of
the suit; or (2) Disclosed to employers or health insurers without the
informed, written consent of the individual. 3 1 2
The statute allows for disclosure of stored tissue for re-
search studies with the patient/participant's consent, if identi-
fied by name or social security number, or without consent, if
not identified by name or social security number, and for publi-
cation of results with similar restrictions.313 The Oklahoma
"Genetic Research Studies Nondisclosure Act" provides that
[a]ll research records of individual subjects in genetic research studies
shall be confidential, meaning the records shall not be subject to sub-
poena or discovery in civil suits, except in cases where the infor-
mation in the records is the basis of the suit. The records shall not be
disclosed to employers or health insurers without the informed con-
309. HAW. REV. STAT. § 324-13 (West 2008).
310. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 121075 (West 2012). The statute was
amended in 2006 to change the scope from AIDS to HIV and AIDS research.
2006 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 20 (West).
311. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 20-35-103 (LexisNexis 2005); OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, §
3614.4 (2011).
312. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 20-35-103(a) (LexisNexis 2005).
313. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 20-35-103(b), (c) (LexisNexis 2005).
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sent of the subject. 3 14
Like the Arkansas statute, the Oklahoma statute permits
tissues to be used for research with consent and allows publica-
tion without identification or with consent if the subject will be
identified. 315 The statute also permits disclosure for life, disa-
bility income, or long-term care insurance and legal proceed-
ings related to such insurance. 316
New Mexico's protection is most similar to the Certificate's
protections, allowing its pharmacy board to
authorize persons engaged in research on the use and effects of con-
trolled substances to withhold the names and other identifying char-
acteristics of individuals who are subjects of the research. Persons
who obtain this authorization are not compelled in any civil, criminal,
administrative, legislative or other proceedings to identify the indi-
viduals who are the subjects of research for which the authorization
was obtained. 3 17
It further provides that
[a] practitioner engaged in medical practice or research shall not be
required to furnish the name or identity of a patient or research sub-
ject to the board, nor may he be compelled in any state or local civil,
criminal, administrative, legislative or other proceedings to furnish
the name or identity of an individual that the practitioner is obligated
to keep confidential. 3 18
In revising its evidence code in 2011, Georgia adopted pro-
tections for research data. In doing so, the legislature declared
that "confidentiality of research data from disclosure in judicial
and administrative proceedings is essential to safeguarding the
integrity of research . .. guaranteeing the privacy of individu-
als who participate in research projects, and ensuring the con-
tinuation of research in science, medicine and other fields that
benefits the [public]." 319 "[C]onfidential raw research data" is
defined as:
medical information, interview responses, reports, statements, memo-
randa, or other data relating to the condition, treatment, or character-
istics of any person which are gathered by or provided to a researcher:
314. OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3614.4(c) (2011).
315. OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3614.4(e) (2011).
316. OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3614.4(d) (2011).
317. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-31-40(B) (West 2003).
318. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-31-40(D) (West 2003). There are some cases that
cite to this statute, but they involve constitutional challenges to the drug par-
aphernalia laws generally, rather than the confidentiality protections specifi-
cally. See, e.g., Weiler v. Carpenter, 507 F.Supp. 837, 839 (D. N.M. 1981);
State v. Carr, 626 P.2d 292, 294 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981); Chouinard v. State, 635
P.2d 986, 986 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980).
319. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-12-2(a) (West 2011).
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(1) In support of a research study approved by an appropriate re-
search oversight committee of a hospital, health care facility, or edu-
cation institution; and (2) with the objective to develop, study, or re-
port aggregate or anonymous information not intended to be used in
any way in which the identify of an individual is material to the re-
sults. 32 0
Such data "shall not be subject to subpoena, otherwise dis-
coverable, or deemed admissible as evidence in any judicial or
administrative proceeding." 321 However, there are several ex-
ceptions to this protection. These include common exceptions,
such as disclosure to the subject or the subject's legally author-
ized representative or to someone authorized in writing by the
individual or her legally authorized representative to receive it,
a government entity when required to be reported by law (e.g.,
communicable disease or child abuse reporting), and in a pro-
ceeding where the research participant places his or her in-
volvement in the study at issue. 322 However, the protections do
not apply when "the researcher has either volunteered to testi-
fy or has been hired to testify."323 Moreover, the protections
seem to disappear in criminal proceedings, as the statute pro-
vides that "the court shall order the production of confidential
raw research data if the data are relevant to any issue in the
proceeding ... and admit confidential raw research data into
evidence if the data are material to the defense or prosecution,"
although the court must also "impose appropriate safeguards
against unauthorized disclosure of the data."324
One of the strengths of these statutes, compared to the
Certificate statute, is that, with the exception of the New Mexi-
co statute,325 the protection attaches to all research within the
statute's scope, either by topic or under the aegis of the state
entity; the protection does not require a researcher to know
about and apply for it. In some cases, the protection afforded is
stronger than that which the Certificate offers. 326 For example,
320. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-12-2(b) (West 2011).
321. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-12-2(c) (West 2011).
322. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-12-2(d) (West 2011).
323. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-12-2(d)(6) (West 2011).
324. Id.
325. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-31-40(D) (West 2003).
326. On the other hand, some state statutes may be less protective than
the Certificate. For example, Georgia's statute appears to eliminate partici-
pants' protections when researchers' act as experts and in the context of all
criminal proceedings. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-12-2 (West 2011).
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the Maryland, North Dakota, and South Dakota statutes ex-
plicitly limit the use of the data for purposes other than re-
search. 327 In addition, these statutes refer to any disclosure, not
just compelled disclosure. 328 Similarly, the Arkansas and Okla-
homa statutes allow disclosure for litigation only if the data
form the basis of the claims. 329 Several of these do not appear to
be limited to identifiable information, even though they may
permit publication of aggregate information.
Although these laws have important strengths compared to
a Certificate, they may ultimately be less protective because, as
state laws, they may not be able to prevent disclosure where
federal law permits or even requires the disclosure.
IV. OTHER AVAILABLE PROTECTIONS
Our interviews with counsel and our review of the cases
suggests that there are a variety of legal tools beyond Certifi-
cates that can be used to try to protect sensitive, identifiable
data from compelled disclosure. While a discussion of all other
potential ways to protect sensitive research data from com-
pelled disclosure is beyond the scope of this paper, in this sec-
tion, we provide a brief overview of some of these tools that
may supplement a Certificate's protections.330
First, our interviews and the cases serve as a reminder of
the general discovery tools that are available when research
data are subpoenaed. Counsel can, and should (where appro-
priate), object to demands, for example, on the grounds of rele-
vance, materiality, breadth, and burden. 331 Objections can form
the basis for negotiating limits on the subpoena, such as ex-
cluding identifiers, or, if necessary, for moving to quash the
subpoena. 332 As noted earlier, counsel frequently are successful
327. MD. CODE. ANN., Health-General § 4-101, 72 (LexisNexis 2009); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 23-01-15 (2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-14-1 (2011).
328. MD. CODE. ANN., Health-General § 4-101, 72 (LexisNexis 2009); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 23-01-15 (2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-14-1 (2011).
329. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 20-35-103 (LexisNexis 2005); OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, §
3614.4 (2011).
330. For a more in-depth discussion of how to address subpoenas for schol-
arly research, see Michael Traynor, Countering the Excessive Subpoena for
Scholarly Research, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119 (1996).
331. Id. at 126. See also FED. R. CIV. PRO. 45; 9A CHARLES A. WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2007 (3d ed. 2012).
332. Traynor, supra note 330, at 126.
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in limiting requests using these types of tools. If disputes do go
to court, then it would be appropriate to request a protective
order.333 As our case examples demonstrate, the protective or-
der can be used not only to limit disclosure of identifiable com-
ponents of data, but also to limit who has access to the data
and how it can be used (e.g., limited to the lawsuit in which it
was subpoenaed), forbid attempts to reidentify, and require de-
struction of data held by the requesting party when the litiga-
tion ends.
Second, some counsel have been successful in protecting
data based on First Amendment claims and/or a researcher's
privilege, a concept akin to a reporter's privilege. These claims
have been particularly successful when the data has not yet
been published, recognizing the researchers' interests in the
fruits of their labor and in choosing how and when to publish
it.334 An example is the case of Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp.335
In this case, Microsoft sought a researcher's "notes, tape record-
ings and transcripts of interviews, and correspondence with in-
terview subjects" pertaining to interviews with Netscape em-
ployees about its battle with Microsoft over search engines. 336
At the time the interviews were conducted, Microsoft had not
yet been sued for the antitrust violations that caused them to
seek the data.337 The case study had not yet been published
when Microsoft subpoenaed the data. 338 The court concluded
that "[a]cademicians engaged in pre-publication research
should be accorded protection commensurate to that which the
law provides for journalists." 339 It reasoned "scholars [like jour-
nalists] are information gatherers and disseminators" 340 and
require protection to avoid a "chilling effect on free speech."341
In the particular circumstances, the researchers had made as-
surances to interviewees that their information would be kept
confidential and that they would have an opportunity to "cor-
333. Id. at 131-34.
334. Id. at 128-31.
335. Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708 (1st Cir. 1998).
336. Id. at 711.
337. Id. at 715.
338. Id. at 711.
339. Id. at 714.
340. Id.
341. Id. (quoting United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176,
1181 (1st Cir. 1988)).
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rect, comment upon, and/or disclaim attributed quotations prior
to publication."342 Accordingly, the First Circuit agreed with the
lower court that "the interviews . . . fall along the continuum of
confidentiality at a point sufficient to justify significant protec-
tion"343 and, that the movant's need for the information was
outweighed by the respondent's need for protection. 344
V. DISCUSSION
As the above discussion demonstrates, Certificates of Con-
fidentiality and other confidentiality statutes and legal doc-
trines can be effective tools for protecting sensitive, identifiable
human subjects research data. However, those protections can
be vulnerable to judicial interpretation. In particular, we found
two areas in which there have been problematic judicial deci-
sions that interpret the Certificate protection in ways that un-
dermine those protections: waiver and identifiability. In this
section, we examine how waiver and identifiability have been
treated in other legal contexts for suggestions on how to ad-
dress the concerns in the context of Certificates. We then con-
sider steps that could be taken to minimize Certificates' vul-
nerabilities we have identified through our analysis.
A. WAIVER OF CONFIDENTIALITY PROTECTIONS
It is not surprising that individual participants may waive
the confidentiality protections afforded by the Certificate and
some of the related statutes we have discussed. The protections
are intended to benefit the individual by maintaining confiden-
tiality, so when circumstances arise, such as that experienced
by Mr. Still, where that confidentiality may disadvantage the
individual, he should be able to waive confidentiality. However,
the Juvenile Court case raises important questions about what
constitutes waiver in this context. Unlike the Still case, where
the defendant made a specific (and written) request that identi-
fiable information about him to be disclosed, in the Juvenile
Court case, the researchers certainly did not intend to waive
342. Id. at 715.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 716-17. Importantly, the court commented on the procedures
the researchers adopted as evidence of the need for protection. Traynor pro-
vides an excellent discussion of what steps researchers should take in their
data collection that would also evidence the importance of confidentiality to
their research to a court should it be necessary. Traynor, supra note 330, at
121-25.
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the protections by reporting their suspicions of child neglect.
Waiver of such important protections should not result from
inadvertent disclosure, nor should disclosure for one purpose
(e.g., protection from abuse or neglect) result in disclosure for
all purposes. Such a broad interpretation is inconsistent with
how the law treats waiver of confidentiality in other context.
Considering how courts address waiver of confidentiality
for medical records is useful to our inquiry for several reasons.
First, much (but not all) sensitive research data is health-
related and, thus, the rationale for protecting it is similar to
that of medical records. 345 Second, the protection for medical
records generally is statutory, like the Certificate, although
there often are many exceptions to the statutory protections,
especially compared to the Certificate language. Finally, there
may be some circumstances in both contexts, such as abuse and
neglect reporting, where there may be strong reasons for re-
vealing some information, and where we do not want a disin-
centive to disclosure, such as waiving all protection. Thus,
there are many similarities between the protections afforded to
medical records and Certificates and, given the lesser protec-
tions afforded to medical records (in that there are greater
statutory exceptions), the limitations applied to waiver in that
context suggest waiver would be found less frequently in the
context of the more absolute protections afforded by the Certifi-
cate.346
One common example where the law finds an individual
waives physician-patient confidentiality is when that individu-
al brings a suit against the physician for medical malpractice.
The doctor can only defend himself if he is allowed to put for-
ward information about his treatment of the patient from the
medical record. However, the central legal question for courts is
the scope of the waiver; that is, what components of the pa-
345. Indeed, while we often consider only the individual's interest in the
confidentiality of their medical records, benefit to others (the primary justifi-
cation for research) is an important part of the justification for protecting pa-
tient confidentiality. Such confidentiality encourages patients to share accu-
rate information about sensitive, communicable diseases, and permits doctors
and public health authorities to take action to prevent disease in others.
346. An important difference between medical records and research records
protected by a Certificate is that medical care is undertaken for personal bene-
fit, whereas research-even where there is the hope of therapeutic benefit-is
undertaken to benefit others. This adds another reason for affording stronger
protections to the research data.
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tient's health have been placed "at issue." In bringing suit for a
faulty knee replacement at age fifty-five, a patient likely does
not expect or intend to place her entire medical history open for
examination, nor does the doctor likely need access to that
whole history to defend himself. In considering whether health
has been placed in issue, courts have looked to relevancy and
specificity as the guiding principles. For example, in Davis v.
Superior Court, a motorist brought a personal injury action
seeking general damages for pain and suffering. 347 The defend-
ant sought the motorist's psychotherapy records but was denied
by the lower court.348 In upholding the decision, the appellate
court stated that the "materials sought must be directly rele-
vant to the issue of pain and suffering associated with the
physical injuries sustained."349 A "garden-variety" claim of pain
and suffering did not place the motorist's mental health in is-
sue, notwithstanding the mental component of the claim. 350 The
Davis court further noted that "the scope of [the waiver neces-
sary for such suits] must be narrowly, rather than expansively,
construed, so that plaintiffs will not be unduly deterred from
instituting lawsuits by fear of exposure of private activities."351
Similarly, in In re Marriage of Bonneau, the court found that a
husband in a divorce proceeding did not place his health in is-
sue by filing for dissolution on the ground of mental cruelty.352
The wife sought the husband's HIV-related medical records,
but the court stated that his health would only have been in is-
sue if the husband's grounds for dissolution were that his wife
infected him with HIV.353 The husband had not "specifically or
affirmatively placed his health in issue in the pleadings."354 A
2010 Georgia case reiterated the need to construe any waiver of
confidentiality to medical information "with narrow specifici-
347. Davis v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 331, 332-33 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992).
348. Id. at 333.
349. Id. at 337.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 335 (citing Vinson v. Superior Court, 740 P.2d 404 (Cal. 1987)).
The court concludes "[t]he scope of any disclosure must be narrowly circum-
scribed, drawn with narrow specificity, and must proceed by the least intru-
sive manner." Id. (citing Binder v. Superior Court, 242 Cal. Rptr. 231, 234
(Cal. Ct. App. 1987)).
352. In re Marriage of Bonneau, 691 N.E.2d 123 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
353. Id. at 132.
354. Id.
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Cases seeking access to HIV-related information, like In re
Marriage of Bonneau, provide additional insight into the issue
of waiver of confidentiality protection. Because of the serious
stigma and discrimination concerning HIV/AIDS early in the
epidemic and continuing today, nearly every state has passed
an HIV confidentially act. When testing first became available,
there were few individual benefits to testing and significant
risks. Strict confidentiality protections were adopted to encour-
age individuals to be tested. As illustrated by Doe v. City of
New York, the protections can extend beyond medical rec-
ords. 356 Doe involved a single, HIV-positive man who filed a
complaint against Delta Airlines with the City of New York
Commission on Human Rights, alleging he was not hired be-
cause of his sexual orientation and suspicion about his HIV sta-
tus. 357 After reaching a settlement between the parties, and
without Doe's permission, the Commission issued a press re-
lease disclosing the terms of the settlement agreement, despite
a confidentiality clause in the settlement agreement.358 Alt-
hough the press release did not identify Doe by name, Doe con-
tended that it violated his privacy because people who knew or
worked with Doe could identify him from the information in-
cluded. 359 The district court dismissed Doe's suit against the
Commission for this breach of privacy, concluding that any
right of privacy Doe possessed had been waived when he origi-
nally brought a discrimination suit against Delta, because it
was a matter of public record and the Commission had a right
355. Baker v. Wellstar Health System, Inc., 703 S.E.2d 601, 604-05 (Ga.
2010). In this case, the plaintiff sued Wellstar for malpractice. Pursuant to
Health Insurance Portibility and Accountability Act (HIPPA), defense counsel
was granted a qualified protective order to conduct ex parte interviews of the
plaintiffs treating physicians. In an interlocutory appeal, the court found that
although HIPAA preempted Georgia law with regard to ex parte communica-
tions between defense counsel and plaintiffs prior treating physicians, the
substantive right to medical privacy under Georgia law endured. Thus the
court found the qualified protective order "too broad regarding the scope of in-
formation that may be disclosed." Rather than allowing discussion of "medical
conditions and any past, present, or future care and treatment . . . the order
should have limited Wellstar's inquiry to matters relevant to the medical con-
dition ... at issue." Id. at 604.
356. Doe v. City of NY., 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994).





to disseminate the results of the agreement. 360 The appellate
court reversed the district court.361 After determining that Doe
did have a right to privacy in his HIV status, 362 the court ad-
dressed the question of whether he waived that right when he
filed a claim with the Commission. 363 Although all conciliation
agreements were made public record by statute, the statute
permitted the Commission to agree not to disclose. 364 The court
noted the "Orwellian" nature of the Commission's position that
Doe had waived any privacy rights concerning his claim when
the Commission is charged with protecting privacy rights.365
While the court conceded that Doe might not prevail, it refused
to find a waiver of confidentiality protections on such general
grounds. 366
Given the ease with which the Juvenile court found waiver
in its case involving a Certificate, it is also useful to consider
how courts have addressed inadvertent disclosure of confiden-
tial information. While the disclosure of the children's identi-
ties cannot be said to have been "inadvertent"-the researchers
certainly intended to convey their concerns about the children
to the Department of Children and Families-the waiver of the
protection (as determined by the court) certainly can be. Yale's
motion to quash makes clear the researchers did not intend to
give up the protections afforded by the Certificate. 367 From the
court's interpretation of waiver, it is not difficult to imagine a
case where a researcher's response, "I cannot give you Jane
Doe's records. She is in a research study protected by a Certifi-
360. Id. at 266.
361. Id. at 270.
362. Id. at 267. In so holding, the court noted that
[e]xtension of the right to confidentiality to personal medical infor-
mation recognizes there are few matters that are quite so personal as
the status of one's health and few matters the dissemination of which
one would prefer to maintain greater control over. Clearly, an indi-
vidual's choice to inform others that she has contracted what is at this
point invariably and sadly a fatal incurable disease is one that she
should normally be allowed to make for herself.
Id. This protection of a medical condition is not available to all conditions,
however. In Matson v. Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of N.Y., the court re-
fused to recognize fibromyalgia as falling within the ambit of constitutionally-
protected privacy. Matson v. Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of N.Y., 631
F.3d 57, 69 (2d Cir. 2011).
363. Doe, 15 F.3d at 267-69.
364. Id. at 268.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 269-70.
367. Memorandum of Decision, supra note 198, at 2.
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cate," is interpreted as a waiver of the protections because the
researcher confirmed the person is a participant in the study.
We found that cases of inadvertent waiver typically come
up in the context of document productions. Courts have taken a
variety of approaches in considering whether the inadvertent
disclosure constitutes a waiver. At one end of the spectrum, a
minority of courts take a strict approach. These courts view the
inadvertent disclosure of any protected information as resulting
in an automatic waiver of the privilege pertaining to that in-
formation and sometimes any related information of the same
subject matter.368 As noted by the court in the leading strict li-
ability approach case, "we do not think it matters whether the
waiver is labeled 'voluntary' or 'inadvertent' [disclosure];" 369 for
the court, the critical fact was the disclosure. The waiver can be
viewed broadly under the strict approach. For example in
S.E.C. v. Microtune, Inc., the court held that the privilege had
been waived as to all documents related to a corporation's in-
ternal investigation of alleged Security and Exchange Commis-
sion violations, even though the corporation had disclosed only
some of the documents related to the internal investigation to
third parties. 370
At the other end of the spectrum, lies another minority ap-
proach, in which courts employ an intent-based approach. Un-
der this approach, an inadvertent disclosure is deemed to be a
waiver only when the party asserting the privilege did not in-
tend to maintain confidentiality. For example, in Heriot v. Byr-
ne, a document vendor accidentally produced attorney-client
privileged documents to the defendant.371 Although the defend-
ants argued that privilege had been waived, the court focused
on the plaintiffs actions after the production, rather than the
fact a significant portion of documents had been produced, to
determine the privilege had not been waived.372 In Heriot, the
plaintiff had taken clear actions to mitigate the inadvertent
368. Importantly, "[t]he attorney-client privilege is waived if the holder of
the privilege voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant
part of the communication to a third party or stranger to the attorney-client
relationship." Memorandum of Opinion and Order at 7-8, Jacob v. Duane-
Reade, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-00160-JPO-THK (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2012).
369. In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
370. S.E.C. v. Microtune, Inc., 258 F.R.D. 310, 317 (N.D. Tex. 2009).
371. Heriot v. Byrne, 257 F.R.D. 645, 651 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
372. Id. at 659.
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disclosure, including contacting the defendants and identifying
the privileged documents that had mistakenly been pro-
duced.373
The majority of courts take a more nuanced approach to
inadvertent waiver, the so-called "middle" approach, and, after
determining the disclosure was in fact inadvertent, weigh a va-
riety of factors in determining whether a privilege has been
waived, including the steps taken to prevent disclosure, the ex-
tent, frequency, and circumstances of disclosure, and post-
disclosure efforts, as well as "the overriding interest of fairness
and justice."374 This analysis is usually a fact-intensive inquiry
into the circumstances surrounding the disclosure. 375 In addi-
tion to being adopted by a majority of courts, the middle road
approach was adopted by the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE)
502(b) in 2008 for use in federal proceedings.376 Although FRE
502(b) uses only two of the factors described by courts (reason-
able precautions to prevent inadvertent disclosure and the
promptness of measures taken to rectify the disclosure), the
advisory committee's note states the rule is "flexible enough to
accommodate any of those listed factors."377
The foregoing analysis suggests that there is significant le-
gal support for limiting access to data even where some protec-
tions have been waived either by the participant or the re-
searcher, provided that the researcher takes appropriate steps
to protect the security of the data. 378 Nevertheless, given the
373. Id.
374. Elizabeth King, Waving Goodbye to Waiver? Not So Fast: Inadvertent
Disclosure, Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege, and Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 502, 32 CAMPBELL L. REV. 467, 481-84 (2010).
375. See, e.g., Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Sandoz Ltd., 916 F. Supp. 404, 411
(D.N.J. 1995) (finding disclosure was not inadvertent given the party seeking
protection failed to take reasonable precautions in protecting the document
and in adopting appropriate safeguards); Memorandum of Opinion and Order,
supra note 368, at 14-16 (finding a waiver, despite the producing party having
taken reasonable steps to prevent the disclosure, because it did not act dili-
gently in rectifying the disclosure).
376. FED. R. EVID. 502(b) ("(b) Inadvertent Disclosure. When made in a
federal proceeding or to a federal office or agency, the disclosure does not op-
erate as a waiver in a federal or state proceeding if: (1) the disclosure is inad-
vertent; (2) the holder of the privilege or protection took reasonable steps to
prevent disclosure; and (3) the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify
the error, including (if applicable) following Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26
(b)(5)(B)."); see also King, supra note 374, at 469.
377. King, supra note 374, at 502-03 (quoting FED R. EVID. 502(b), adviso-
ry committee's note).
378. This analysis especially holds when disclosure of specific, limited in-
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existence of problematic cases involving waiver, researchers
should be careful to avoid inadvertently waiving the Certifi-
cate's protections or expanding the scope of the waiver. For ex-
ample, researchers may want to avoid explicitly confirming the
participation of any individual when research data are request-
ed and to limit the amount of data shared in response to any
request-compelled or otherwise. 379 Scrupulously following con-
fidentiality measures will make it easier for an attorney to ar-
gue for keeping the data confidential.
B. IDENTIFIABILITY
As has been discussed, Certificates of Confidentiality exist
to protect the "names and other identifying characteristics of
research study participants," not research data itself.380 How-
ever, the term "other identifying characteristics" is not further
defined within the statute. 381 In its Frequently Asked Ques-
formation, such as disclosure of suspected abuse, was in no sense inadvertent
but rather specifically foreseen and planned for (i.e., provided for in research
protocols and consent forms, and the application for a Certificate). Applying
for a Certificate would also be evidence of the researchers taking appropriate
steps to protect the security of the data. All researchers should also follow
basic confidentiality measures (what some have referred to as "Security 101"),
including limiting who has access to the data (particularly identifiers), using
password protection on electronic files, storing data in locked cabinets and of-
fices, and coding data whenever feasible and keeping code links separate from
the data.
379. In the Bradley case, Duke took this type of approach by fighting the
subpoena without indicating whether the witness was, in fact, a research par-
ticipant in the study from which data was sought. Compelled Disclosure of Da-
ta, supra note 23, at 1054. We recognize, however, that fighting a subpoena for
data protected by a Certificate may be interpreted as confirmation of partici-
pation.
380. FAQs on Certificates, supra note 1. Specifically, NIH states that
"[r]esearchers can use a Certificate to avoid compelled 'involuntary disclosure'
(e.g., subpoenas) of names and other identifying information about any indi-
vidual who participates as a research subject (i.e., about whom the investiga-
tor maintains identifying information) during any time the Certificate is in
effect." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the NIH Certificate kiosk mirrors the lan-
guage in the authorizing statute, which allows researchers "to protect the pri-
vacy of individuals who are the subject of such research by withholding from
all persons not connected with the conduct of such research the names or other
identifying characteristics of such individuals." 42 U.S.C. § 241(d) (2006) (em-
phasis added).
381. 42 U.S.C. § 241(d) (2006). The lack of a precise definition can be seen
in similar language contained in other privacy protection statutes. See The
Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4) (2006) (defining an individual's "rec-
ord" as a "grouping of information about an individual ... that contains 'his
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tions on the Certificate kiosk, NIH indicates that "other identi-
fying information" includes details such as the "name, address,
social security or other identifying number, fingerprints, voice-
prints, photographs, genetic information or tissue samples, or
any other item or combination of data about a research partici-
pant which could reasonably lead, directly or indirectly by ref-
erence to other information, to identification of that research
subject."382 However, despite this expansive definition of "iden-
tifying characteristics," it is unclear what information can
make an individual "readily identifiable" and, thus, should be
protected by a Certificate.
When the Certificate protection was first adopted in 1970,
the focus on name and other identifying characteristics made
sense. 383 Particularly in its earliest incarnation, the risk to in-
dividuals came from being identified as a user of illegal
drugs. 384 However, as technology has advanced, concerns about
how data may be used and how to protect private information
have evolved. An apt example of this movement can be seen in
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996 (HIPAA)385 and its accompanying regulations promulgat-
ed by the Department of Health and Human Services, Stand-
ards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Infor-
mation.386 Spurred by an understanding that advances in
technology and practice had undermined the ability of tradi-
tional common law doctrines to protect personal health infor-
mation, HIPAA and its accompanying regulations sought to
name, or the identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular as-
signed to the individual, such as a finger or voice print or photograph"'); Con-
fidential Information Protection and Statistical Efficiency Act of 2002, 44
U.S.C. § 3501 note (2006) (defining "identifiable form" as "any representation
of information that permits the identity of the respondent to whom the infor-
mation applies to be reasonably inferred by either direct or indirect means").
382. FAQs on Certificates, supra note 1. Again, the NIH's description is
consistent with the regulation, which defines "identifying characteristics" as
"name, address, any identifying number, fingerprints, voiceprints, photo-
graphs or any other item or combination of data about a research subject
which could reasonably lead directly or indirectly by reference to other infor-
mation to identification of that research subject." 42 C.F.R. § 2a.2(g) (2011).
383. Guidance on Certificates of Confidentiality, NAT'L INSTS. HEALTH,
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/policy/certconpriv.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2012).
384. Id.
385. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-91, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
386. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.500-534 (2011).
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provide a national standard for protecting health information,
including defining eighteen pieces of information considered to
be identifying. 387 Despite this extensive list, some have begun
to fear that re-identification of individuals may be possible no
matter how many "identifying characteristics" have been re-
moved from released data.388
Recent studies demonstrate so-called "anonymized" data
can sometimes be re-identified using publicly available infor-
mation.389 In the mid-1990s, Dr. Latanya Sweeney demonstrat-
ed that she could identify eighty-seven percent of individuals by
combining three simple identifiers: five-digit ZIP code, birth
date (including year), and sex. 390 Similarly, in 2006, both AOL
and Netflix participated in large scale data releases which led
to re-identification of individuals. Spurred by a vision of an
387. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2). The list of identifiers includes: "[n]ames,"
'geographic subdivisions smaller than a state," " [a]ll elements of dates (except
year) . . . related to an individual" (including dates of admission, discharge,
birth, death and, for individuals over eighty-nine-years old, the year of birth
must not be used), "[t]elephone numbers," "[flax numbers" "[e]lectronic mail
addresses," "[s]ocial Security numbers," "[m]edical record numbers," "[h]ealth
plan beneficiary numbers" '[a]ccount numbers," "[c]ertificate/license num-
bers," "[v]ehicle identifiers and serial numbers, including license plates,"
"[d]evice identifiers and serial numbers," web URLs, internet protocol ad-
dresses, "[b]iometric identifiers, including finger and voice prints" "[f]ull face
photos and comparable images" and "[a]ny unique identifying number, charac-
teristic or code." Id. Data without these identifiers are considered "deindenti-
fied" and available for research without consent.
388. Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising
Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1704 (2010). Ohm argues
that "[d]ata can be either useful or perfectly anonymous, but never both." Id.
389. See Robert Gellman, The Deidentification Dilemma: A Legislative and
Contractual Proposal, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 33, 37
(2010); Ohm, supra note 388, at 1716-22; Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J.
Solove, The P11 Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable
Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1836-43 (2011); Jane Yakowitz, Tragedy
of the Data Commons, 25 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1, 31-33, 39-41 (2011). While
these are not human subjects research data, they are useful for understanding
the challenges to deidentification in light of today's technology and widely ac-
cessible information.
390. Latanya Sweeney, Simple Demographics Often Identify People
Uniquely 2 (Carnagie Mellon Univ., Data Privacy Working Paper No. 3, 2000).
To drive the point home, Dr. Sweeney identified then Massachusetts governor,
William Weld's, medical records from data released by the Massachusetts
Group Insurance Commission (GIC), which summarized every state employ-
ee's hospital visits and was available at no cost to any researcher who request-
ed the records, based on his zip code, birth date and gender. Latanya Sweeney,
k-Anoymity: A Model for Protecting Privacy, 10 INT'L J. UNCERTAINTY,
FUZZINESS & KNOWLEDGE-BASED Sys. 557, 558-59 (2002).
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"open research community," AOL released twenty million
search queries created by 657,000 AOL users that, despite
AOL's efforts to anonymize the data, were often relinked to in-
dividuals. 391 Netflix's release of one hundred million records
showing how nearly 500,000 users had rated movies on Netflix
over a period of six years similarly resulted in re-identification
of users. 392 Despite what these examples suggest about our
ability to protect individuals' confidentiality through removal of
identifying information, others maintain that it is still possible
to maintain confidentiality through the removal of personally
identifying information. 393 Additionally, a study conducted by
the Department of Health and Human Services Office of the
National Coordinator for Health Information Technology
("ONC") demonstrates how challenging it is to re-identify data
properly de-identified under HIPAA.394 Of the 15,000 datasets
391. Michael Barbaro & Tom Zeller, Jr., A Face is Exposed for AOL Search-
er No. 4417749, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2006, at Al. AOL took steps to anonymize
the data, including assigning each searcher a numerical code name. Id. Never-
theless, bloggers and researchers pouring over the databases were able to
reidentify individuals from information in the released data. Id.
392. The Netflix Prize Rules, NETFLIX, http://www.netflixprize.com/rules
(last visited Apr. 6, 2012). Like AOL and GIC, Netflix took steps to anonymize
the data by assigning unique user identifiers. Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly
Shmatikov, How to Break the Anonymity of the Netflix Prize Dataset, ARVIX
(Oct. 16, 2006), http://www.citebase.org/abstract?id=oai:arXiv.org:cs/0610105.
For each user, Netflix revealed the movie rated, the rating given, and the date
of the rating. Id. Two weeks after the release, two researchers at the Universi-
ty of Texas showed that, using user ratings on the Internet Movie Database
(IMDb), they were able to re-identify individuals in the Netflix Prize Dataset.
Id. Scholars note the Netflix study is a perfect example of a piece of infor-
mation that had not been considered personally identifying information-
movie ratings-becoming an identifier. See Ohm, supra note 388, at 1742
("The trouble is that PII is an ever-expanding category. Ten years ago, almost
nobody would have categorized movie ratings and search queries as PII, and
as a result, no law or regulation did either."); Yakowitz, supra note 389, at 25
("Their study illustrates how the Internet is a (relatively) new public infor-
mation resource that blurs the distinction between non-identifiers and indirect
identifiers. The Internet affects data anonymization by archiving and aggre-
gating large quantities of information and by making information gathering
practically costless. It also provides a platform for self-revelation and self-
publication, making the available range of information about any one person
unpredictable and practically limitless.").
393. See generally Yakowitz, supra note 389, at 44-50 (offering an im-
proved approach to the release of anonymized data).
394. Deborah Lafky, The Safe Harbor Method of De-Identification: An Em-
pirical Test (2009), available at http://www.ehcca.com/presentations/
HIPAAWest4/lafky_2.pdf. The study asked, "Can a Safe Harbor de-identified
data set be combined with readily available outside data to re-identify data set
subjects?" Id. at 6. To determine this question, the study first pulled approxi-
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in the study, the team was only able to correctly and accurately
identify two individuals, for a match rate of 0. 0 1%.39 5
While these examples animate the broader debate about
whether deidentification is ever feasible, for our purposes, they
serve to illustrate how the world has changed since Certificates
were first adopted in 1970, and to suggest that our understand-
ing of what Certificates protect needs to adapt to that world. In
particular, to keep confidentiality promises to research partici-
pants, the research community needs to be prepared to articu-
late how seemingly unidentified data could be "readily identifi-
able" and, therefore, protected by a Certificate.
Some courts that have addressed statutory language simi-
lar to 42 U.S.C. § 241(d) and the regulations in determining
whether revealing certain types of data may lead to re-
identification of specific individuals have adopted a broader
conception of "identifiability." For example, in Hassig v. New
York State Department of Health, the petitioners sought to "im-
plement a cancer prevention program in St. Lawrence County,"
and requested records from the Department of Health under
the Freedom of Information Law. 396 Petitioners specifically re-
quested "records from the State Cancer Registry of 'cancer site
specific diagnoses and deaths from the period of 1976-1997 for
St. Lawrence County."'397 In addition to this information, the
petitioners sought "information for all age groups . . . except in
those instances where there were two or less cancer site specific
records for a particular year and zip code." 398
The Department of Health denied the petitioners' requests
mately 15,000 Safe Harbor method de-identified patient records. Id. at 16. To
increase the likelihood of an "easy" match, all of the records pulled self-
identified as part of a large minority ethnic group. Id. The researchers then
manually compared the deidentified datasets with identifiable records from a
commercially available data repository. The researchers explained that the
decision to go through the re-identification process manually stemmed from
the fact that "[t]here are no matching algorithms the team knows of that are
more accurate than using human judgment because (a) contextual knowledge
is essential" and "(b) data sources are 'dirty."' Id. at 19. The study concluded
that matching up Safe Harbor de-identified data with publicly available in-
formation is labor-intensive, costly, demonstrates a low yield, and that under
most circumstances, the Safe Harbor method of de-identification protects
against re-identification. Id.
395. Id. at 19.





on the basis of two statutes. 399 First, the Department referred
to Public Health Law § 2402 which states, "The reports of can-
cer cases made pursuant to the provisions of [Public Health
Law article 42] shall not be divulged or made public so as to
disclose the identity of any person to whom they relate, to by
any persons ... ."400 Second, the Department relied upon 42
U.S.C. § 280(e), which prohibits the "disclosure to any person of
information . . . that identifies, or could lead to the identifica-
tion of, an individual cancer patient."401 Relying on these statu-
tory provisions, the Department argued that providing the in-
formation requested by the petitioners "could lead to the
disclosure of the identity of a particular cancer patient" and
must be denied. 402 In support of this argument, the Department
produced an affidavit by the Director of the State Cancer Regis-
try outlining "possible scenarios under which the information
sought by petitioners could, in combination with other readily
available information, be used to identify specific cancer pa-
tients."403 Relying solely on the affidavit produced by the De-
partment, the court found that the Department had "articulat-
ed a particularized and specific justification for denying access
to the records in question-namely, that such records, when
combined with other readily available information, including
community knowledge, could identify or lead to the identifica-
tion of individual cancer patients."404 Thus, the court accepted
the possible scenarios outlined by the Department as potential-
ly identifying and denied the petitioners' requests without fur-
ther inquiry into the question of possible re-identification of the
cancer patients. 405
In contrast, in Southern Illinoisan v. Illinois Department of
Public Health, while the Supreme Court of Illinois considered
the impact of technology in determining whether the requested
information could potentially lead to re-identification, it ulti-
mately took a narrower view on what counted as "identifia-
ble."406 In that case, the Southern Illinoisan newspaper re-
399. Id.
400. Id. at 782; N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2402 (McKinney 2011) (emphasis
added).
401. 42 U.S.C. § 280e(c)(2)(D)(v) (2006); Hassig, 294 A.D.2d at 782.
402. Hassig, 294 A.D.2d at 782.
403. Id.
404. Id. at 783.
405. Id.
406. S. Illinoisan v. Dep't. of Pub. Health, 844 N.E.2d 1, 21 (111. 2006).
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quested information from the Illinois Health and Hazardous
Substances Registry (Cancer Registry) "about incidents of neu-
roblastoma, a rare form of childhood cancer."407 The requested
information included the type of cancer, zip code, and date of
diagnosis of each incidence of neuroblastoma within Illinois
from 1985 to the present.408 The Department denied the re-
quest, and the newspaper then filed a complaint to evaluate the
denial pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. 409
At a bench trial, the Department relied upon two statutory
provisions in support of the denial. First, the Department ar-
gued that the Registry Act precluded the Department from dis-
closing any information that revealed "the identity, or any
group of facts which tends to lead to the identity, of any person
whose condition or treatment is submitted to the Illinois Health
and Hazardous Substances Registry."410 Thus, the Department
argued that the Illinois Freedom of Information Act, which ex-
empts from disclosure "[i]nformation specifically prohibited
from disclosure by . . . State law or rules and regulations adopt-
ed under . . . State law," forbade the disclosure. 411 In support of
this argument, the Department presented Dr. Latanya
Sweeney as an expert witness on data anonymity. 412 Dr.
Sweeney opined that it would be very easy for anyone with a
computer and readily available software to reidentify persons
from the Cancer Registry using public data sets.413 The circuit
court, however, disagreed, concluding after an in camera review
of Dr. Sweeney's methodology that non-experts could not com-
plete the re-identification that Dr. Sweeney had and, thus, the
information requested "will not reasonably tend to lead to the
407. Id. at 2.
408. Id. at 3.
409. Id.
410. Id. at 4; 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 525/4(d) (2011).
411. S. Illinoisan, 844 N.E.2d at 4 (quoting 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/7(1)(a)
(West 2011)).
412. Id. at 7. Dr. Sweeney was qualified as an expert based on her under-
graduate degree in computer science from Harvard University, master's de-
gree in computer science and electrical engineering from MIT, and a Ph.D in
computer science from MIT, and her extensive experience in 'numerous cases
involving data privacy questions and the anonymity of data." Id.
413. Id. at 8-9. Using similar techniques to those she used in the Massa-
chusetts health information example described above, Dr. Sweeney was able to
reidentify eighteen of twenty individuals whose data was contained in the
Cancer Registry based on the pieces of information requested by Southern Il-
linoisan and anything else she could find from public sources. Id. at 7.
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identification of individuals" and ordered production of the da-
ta.414
Both the Appellate and Supreme Courts agreed with the
Circuit Court's determination. The appellate court elaborated
on the circuit court's reasoning, explaining that:
[T]he fact that one expert in data anonymity can manipulate data to
determine identity does not necessarily mean, without more, that a
threat exists that other individuals will be able to do so as well, nor
does it in any way define the magnitude of such a threat or whether
that threat, if it in fact even exists, renders the release of the data an
act that reasonably tends to lead to the identity of specific persons. To
find otherwise would undermine the reasonableness requirement and
would effectively remove it from our analysis, leading to a situation
where if it could be shown that one expert could identify individuals
from information released, then the release of that information would
automatically be deemed to reasonably tend to lead to the identity of
specific persons. 4 1 5
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Appel-
late Court.416
The disagreement about identifiability represented by
these two cases is similarly found in the Certificate cases. The
Attorney General's opinion in the Louisville case took the
broader view, explicitly considering how the data could be com-
bined with other information to identify individual research
participants with potentially negative consequences. 417 On the
other hand, other courts have ordered production of data from a
small number of research participants, when the requester al-
ready had identified data about them as litigants, rendering
them potentially vulnerable to reidentification. 418 Moreover,
the courts in Bradley and the juvenile case were willing to
compel production of particular individuals simply because the
subpoenaing party knew the individual's name and had some
information suggesting study participation. 419 In order to re-
spect research participants' expectations and maintain their
trust in the confidentiality promises made to them, greater
clarity is needed about what information should be considered
"identifiable" and what data is actually protected when a Cer-
414. Id. at 5, 9.
415. Id. at 11 (quoting S. Illinoisan v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 349 Ill. App. 3d
431, 436 (2004)).
416. Id. at 21.
417. Op. Ky. Att'y Gen., supra note 137.
418. See, e.g., In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liability Litiga-
tion discussion supra Part I.D.
419. See discussion of these cases supra Part IJ.C-D.
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tificate is obtained. We would suggest that advances in tech-
nology and availability of vast amounts of information through
the internet demand a broader concept of identifiability than
may previously have been adopted. In the next part, we suggest
ways to do so.
C. POTENTIAL WAYS FOR STRENGTHENING THE PROTECTIONS OF
IDENTIFIABLE RESEARCH DATA
Having identified these potential vulnerabilities, we must
consider whether there are ways to strengthen the Certificate's
protection. In doing so, we are assuming that doing so is desir-
able. We base our assumption on the support of Congress in
maintaining the Certificate as a tool for researchers and ex-
panding the range of research that is eligible for a Certifi-
cate, 420 the NIH's decision to encourage increased use of Certif-
icates, 421 and the support for the Certificate we have heard
from researchers, IRB Chairs, and legal counsel.422 There are
several possible strategies for addressing the potential vulner-
abilities and, thus, strengthening Certificates. These include
both short and long term strategies. Because some may be more
feasible politically, it may be advantageous to use multiple
strategies.
The vulnerabilities we have identified arise because the
concepts of waiver and identifiability are not defined in the
statute, nor are they fully fleshed out in the regulations or NIH
guidance. Amending the statute to address the effect that vol-
untary disclosure has on the continuing protections, and under
what circumstances data are considered "identifiable" in light
of technological and informational advances, would be the
strongest approach.423 However, there are also drawbacks to
this strategy. First, a statute may not be flexible enough to
420. See supra Part II.A.
421. Leslie E. Wolf et al., The Certificate of Confidentiality Application: A
View from the NIH Institutes, 26 IRB 14, 14 (2004).
422. Wolf, supra note 17, at 6; Compelled Disclosure of Data, supra note 23,
at 9; Leslie E. Wolf & Jola Zandecki, Sleeping Better at Night: Investigators'
Experiences with Certificates of Confidentiality, 28 IRB 1, 4-8 (2006).
423. Amending the statute would provide an additional opportunity to con-
sider whether there are better ways to structure the Certificate's protections.
For example, some of the other federal statutes and many of the state statutes
provide coverage to research generally without requiring an application, and
some provide a broader spectrum of coverage to the data. These features may
be worth considering as an alternative to the current Certificate approach.
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keep up with the rapidly changing technology and increasing
availability of information. Some of the specifics may be better
addressed through regulations or guidance, which are more
easily changed. Second, in the current political environment,
getting any legislation passed is challenging, and, thus, it may
not be feasible to implement statutory change.
It may be easier to put forward definitions through the
regulatory process. Because the legislation enabling the Certifi-
cate program does not prescribe specific procedures or refer to
the formal rulemaking procedures of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, the informal procedures of that Act govern any regu-
lations HHS promulgates. 424 An informal rulemaking proce-
dure requires publication in the Federal Register of a notice of
proposed rulemaking that includes the time and location of any
upcoming rulemaking proceedings, "reference to the legal au-
thority under which the rule is proposed," and a description of
the terms, substance, or nature of the proposed rule.425 Infor-
mal rulemaking offers interested parties a chance to submit
"written data, views, or arguments," leaving to the agency the
option of allowing an opportunity for oral presentation. 4 26 The
Administrative Procedure Act requires the agency to include in
its adopted rules "a concise general statement of
their . . . purpose." 427 Of course, there are political considera-
tions to the regulatory process, as well, which may limit the
ability to effectuate change.428
424. 1 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & PRACTICE § 2:33 (2d
ed. 1997).
425. Adminstrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2006).
426. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
427. Id. The informal rulemaking process is, not surprisingly, easier than
the formal rulemaking procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act.
Id. §§ 556-57. Formal rulemaking requirements include hearings in the pres-
ence of an impartial presiding officer, and a prohibition on ex parte communi-
cations among agency decision-makers and interested persons outside the
agency. Id. §§ 556(b), 557(d)(1)(A). Hearings for the purpose of a formal rule-
making may include subpoenas, evidentiary rulings, and depositions. Id.
§ 556(c). Interested parties to a formal rulemaking are entitled to present oral
evidence and conduct cross-examination. Id. § 556(d).
428. In 2011, the Department of Health and Human Services issued an ad-
vance notice of proposed rule-making concerning proposed changes to the fed-
eral regulations governing human subjects research. Human Subjects Re-
search Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research Subjects and Reducing
Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 44512 (Jul. 26,
2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 46, 160 & 164, and 21 C.F.R. pts. 50 &
56). Despite significant attention within the research community, and tens of
thousands of responses, it is unclear at this point whether any changes will in
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An alternative to regulatory amendment is for HHS to is-
sue guidance clarifying the nature of the protection afforded by
a Certificate and how concepts of identifiability and waiver
play into that protection. Distinct from "legislative rules," the
term "guidance" includes a number of possible agency pro-
nouncements that do not carry the force of law and are not
made pursuant to delegated authority. 429 The category includes
"interpretative rules" and "general statements of policy," both
explicitly exempt from the notice-and-comment and hearing re-
quirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. 430 The term
"guidance" also includes documents variously referred to as
guidelines and manuals.431 A guidance document is final agen-
cy action subject to immediate judicial review.432
While such guidance can be useful to individuals interact-
ing with the agency (e.g., in this case, can enhance researchers'
and IRBs' understanding of Certificates), it also has legal sig-
nificance. While not entitled to as much deference as regula-
tions that interpret a statute that is silent or ambiguous on an
issue, 433 agency guidance is entitled to some deference by re-
viewing courts, referred to as Skidmore deference. 434 In Skid-
more, the Supreme Court described the factors affecting the
weight that should be given guidance documents:
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Ad-
fact be made to the regulations.
429. KOCH, JR., supra note 424, § 1:20.
430. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (d) (2006); KOCH, JR., supra note 424, § 1:20.
431. KOCH, JR., supra note 424, § 1:20.
432. Appalachian Power Co. v. E.P.A., 208 F.3d 1015, 1020-21 (D.C. Cir.
2000). See also Barrick Goldstrike Mines Inc. v. Browner, 215 F.3d 45, 48
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding that a guidance document is final if it constituted the
consummation of the agency's decision-making process and determined rights
and obligations with legal consequences).
433. See Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837,
843-44 (1984) (holding that courts must defer to an agency's reasonable statu-
tory interpretation where Congress has made an implicit agency delegation).
In Chevron, the Court reviewed an E.P.A. regulation allowing a state to define
the term "stationary source" to include an entire plant, rather than a particu-
lar pollution-emitting device. Id. The regulation had been promulgated accord-
ing to formal procedures and published in the Code of Federal Regulations. Id.
at 840-41, 853, 855.
434. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241 (2001). The Court has
ruled that "interpretive rules . . . enjoy no Chevron status as a class." Id. at
232. However, guidance documents are entitled to Skidmore deference. Chris-
tensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 585-87 (2000) (relying on cases in
which Skidmore deference was used for guidance documents).
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ministrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by
reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and in-
formed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will de-
pend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity
of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronounce-
ments, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lack-
ing power to control.4 3 5
As Koch explains, "Skidmore deference means that the
agency's interpretation is compelling only if it has the 'power to
persuade' as opposed to Chevron deference by which the agen-
cy's view must be accepted if 'reasonable."' 436 Koch further
notes that courts reviewing guidance pronouncements general-
ly give them more weight when they contain one or more of
these characteristics, either because they are following Skid-
more or through their own instincts. 437 He concludes, "In the
end, the persuasiveness is the key."438 Courts have consistently
found that longstanding pronouncements deserve great defer-
ence.
While deference is not guaranteed, HHS should take ad-
vantage of the experience it has with Certificates to educate
courts about their purpose and scope. It already does so to some
extent through the NIH Certificate kiosk. The kiosk contains a
wide variety of information, from basic instructions for investi-
gators, to information about the statute authorizing Certifi-
cates, to contact information for NIH legal counsel.439 However,
HHS could expand this information to provide more guidance
regarding how it views the Certificates it issues, issues that
have arisen, and how those issues have been resolved.440 Pro-
435. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
436. KOCH, JR., supra note 424, § 11:30.
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. Certificates of Confidentiality Kiosk, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & Hum.
SERVICES, http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/coc/ (last updated Sept. 4, 2012).
440. While the current guidance is issued by NIH, it is not clear whether
this is done with official delegated authority that would make it more likely
that it would receive Skidmore deference. The Certificate implementing stat-
ute grants authority only to the Secretary of HHS, although the regulation de-
fines "secretary" as "the Secretary of Health and Human Services and any
other officer or employee of the Department of Health and Human Services to
whom the authority involved has been delegated." 42 U.S.C. § 241(d) (2006);
42 C.F.R. § 2a.2(a) (2011). This suggests that the Secretary could delegate au-
thority to someone within NIH knowledgeable about Certificates. Such delega-
tion is consistent with the General Administration Manual, which outlines
agency policy whereby an organization within the agency may request a writ-
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vided the guidance is consistent with its overall position, which
has supported strong confidentiality protections, courts would
likely welcome guidance on this otherwise unfamiliar topic. In
any event, issuing guidance is likely to be the easiest to accom-
plish4 41 and, therefore, may a good short-term strategy.
Even if more detailed guidance from HHS does not get def-
erence in judicial decision-making, such guidance can be bene-
ficial from an educational standpoint. As our data indicated, at-
torneys do not confront Certificate issues frequently in their
careers, and, thus, are unlikely to develop expertise in the area.
Judges are even less likely to confront Certificate issues be-
cause attorneys often resolve them outside of court. According-
ly, attorneys and judges need resources to help them get up to
speed on this relatively unique protection. HHS, through the
NIH, may be in the best position to provide useful resources.442
In addition to knowing what types of research are using Certif-
icates, NIH is in a position to know about legal demands. The
kiosk recommends that researchers contact the NIH Certificate
coordinator who issued their Certificate when a demand is
made and indicates that the "[t]he Office of the NIH Legal Ad-
visor is willing to discuss the regulations with the researcher's
attorney."443 Accordingly, providing more detailed guidance
could provide important, practical information to those con-
fronting a legal demand involving a Certificate.
CONCLUSION
In sum, while Certificates have generally been effective as
a deterrent to legal demands for research data and have also
ten delegation of authority from the Secretary by written request outlining the
legal authority upon which the Secretary may delegate. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., GENERAL ADMINISTRATION MANUAL § 8-101-20(A) (2006)
available at http://www.hhs.gov/hhsmanuals/administration.pdf. Generally,
the legal authority exists unless specifically prohibited by statute. Id.
441. While this may be the "easiest" strategy, it does not mean that it is
easily accomplished. The internal review process within an agency can be
time-consuming and politically sensitive. However, at least it is all within the
control of the agency, unlike regulatory or statutory amendments.
442. NIH already provides important information about Certificates
through the Certificate kiosk, which we rely on frequently in our own work.
Certificates of Confidentiality Kiosk, supra note 439. We are aware that the
NIH has worked recently to reorganize the information on the website to make
it more accessible to users. Personal Communication, Ann Hardy, NIH Certifi-
cate of Confidentiality Coordinator (Oct. 27, 2012).
443. FAQs on Certificates, supra note 1.
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been successful when disputes end up in court, those protec-
tions have some vulnerabilities, particularly arising from
changing technological and informational advances. IRBs, re-
searchers, and, presumably, research participants rely on Cer-
tificates to protect sensitive, identifiable research data and fa-
cilitate research on important public health issues. We owe it to
them to ensure those protections are as strong as possible. We
have suggested several ways, from increased guidance to
amending the regulations and statute, that some of the uncer-
tainty concerning Certificate's protections could be addressed.
We have also highlighted broader protections offered by other
federal statutes and state statutes as alternative models for
modifying the Certificate structure.

